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POLAND

National PZPR Conference: Party Seeks Base for Doctrinal Change

26000526 Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish No 20, 14 May 89 p 3

[Article by Leszek Bedkowski: "A Rebus With Tens: The PZPR Leadership Seeks Acceptance of Doctrinal Change From Its Own Base"]

[Text] I answer as follows the question of what the Second National Conference of PZPR Delegates [KKD] (Warsaw, 4-5 May 1989) was all about: it was an attempt to solve a rebus containing two tens, one referring to the 10th PZPR Congress and the other to the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum. Those behind with the news are owed an explanation.

The 10th Congress, held in 1986, took place under the slogan "National Reconciliation and Struggle." Recently, public comments by the more radical PZPR activists have been indicating that the resolutions of the 10th Congress "made a mockery" of the preceding and very reform-oriented Ninth Extraordinary Congress of 1981. During the deliberations of the KKD (an acronym pronounced "Kakadu") last week, no one put it as bluntly as that. But an overtone of doubts as to the effects of the 10th Congress was noticeable. [As for the 10th Plenum, held in January 1989, it accepted the existence of Solidarity and led to the roundtable.]

This was put most sharply by Andrzej Kratiuk, a senior assistant lecturer at the Main School of Planning and Statistics, who, speaking from the KKD podium, described as follows his participation in the 10th Congress: "It [the Congress] produced the impression of being so efficiently organized as to be dangerous, with its ecletically broad program which provided for everything but in reality settled nothing."

Others spoke more circumspectly. Janusz Kubasiewicz (alternate member of the Politburo, first secretary of the Warsaw Voivodship PZPR Committee) declared, "Life itself has in many ways forged ahead of the PZPR Program adopted by the 10th Congress, and of the resolution of that congress." Prime Minister Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski said, "In militancy the mood of that congress was inferior to the mood reigning at the Ninth Congress. The anxiety was not as pronounced, and there was something lacking in imaginativeness as well." It must be admitted, however, that a majority of the delegates preferred to mention the Ninth and Tenth Congresses in the same breath, with the summation: reforms, national reconciliation, struggle.

But had everything been okay, Marian Orzechowski would not have declared as follows (availing himself of the right of rejoinder): "It was the reality, above all, that exposed our deficiencies. After all, it was the real world and not the [political] opponent that demonstrated that

our theories and doctrines, once valid as an outgrowth of the reality, nowadays can neither account for the same real world nor provide us with tools for changing this real world." And he added the punchline, "Because the 10th Plenum essentially represented the admission that we are changing our doctrines and baring the deficiencies of our theories in order to replace them with more effective doctrines and theories that fit this real world better."

This is how the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum came about; at that plenum the "opening" toward the opposition, parliamentary democracy, and the civic society was made, with [the party] thus depriving itself of its hegemony. The dramatic course of discussions at that plenum was narrated by, among others, Professor Janusz Reykowski in the interview, "A Symmetrical Order," he had granted to PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY (No 7, 1989).

So now has gathered the National Conference of Delegates, that is, the same people who had nearly 3 years ago deliberated in the same Congress Auditorium as delegates to the 10th Congress. Will they support the resolutions of the 10th Central Committee Plenum? Generally speaking, they did support them. According to the Press Spokesman of the Central Committee Jan Bisztyga, "The course of the KKD demonstrated the party's growing acceptance of the changes, of the decisions of the 10th Plenum." The rebus appears solved, but not everyone feels quite that way. Walerian Solinski (Deputy Director of the Dozamet Plant in Nowa Sol) took the floor and told the KKD delegates, "As for the party, we must be aware that at the moment we are internally divided. The division reflects the attitudes toward the course and resolutions of the 10th Plenum."

On the whole, however, the acceptance of these resolutions could be expected in recent weeks, even though months earlier this had been not so obvious to those who kept track of the discussions within the PZPR following the January decisions [of the 10th Plenum]. However, the doubts had been elucidated at 15 regional party meetings prior to the KKD.

Still, within the framework of democracy, anything could be expected. Some observers of the KKD discussions had at a certain moment made a perplexing discovery. Namely, this time the stick being stirred inside an anthill was a stick "from the left." The word "reform," which as late as 10 years ago had been a forbidden word in the party, was now used by everybody. But those voices from the left were not numerous. One delegate demanded that anyone who refuses to admit the rationale of the socialist state should be excluded from teaching, and he criticized a draft ordinance (ensuing from the roundtable agreements) specifying that a teacher's evaluation should not be influenced by his political beliefs. The same delegate had, however, immediately declared his full and unconditional support for General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Another delegate criticized the "myth of the [national] reconciliation" as a

bourgeois idea. Another still was worried because the PZPR wants to be an organization good for everyone, and that it pays particular attention to winning over "nonparty members and opponents," whereas it should primarily tap the energies of its own base of support. When, however, he tried to name those whom the PZPR should win over, he enumerated: blue-collar workers, teachers, physicians, scientists, engineers, farmers....

Since we are speaking of base of support, interesting findings of a poll conducted among the employees of 17 largest enterprises were provided by Janusz Kubasiewicz. To the question, "Which group interests is the party promoting best?" only 8.5 percent of the respondents answered, "The interests of workers." (For comparison, 14 percent named the interests of the private sector and 12 percent the interests of the apparatus of power.)

In sum, however, support for the new policy of the PZPR predominated, even though it was hedged with reservations and doubts. For example, Zdzislaw Hinz (a school principal in Rogozno) said, "It is untrue that we are not accepting the resolution of the 10th Plenum. But we demand to be informed [in the future] greatly in advance of such important resolutions." Comments also were made that the KKD should have preceded the 10th Plenum. Eugeniusz Gutman (the manager of the Siarkopol Sulfur Plant in Grzybow) declared, "In terms of theory we accomplished a revolution within a half-year. A dormant party exploded into life with a tremendous intellectual potential. This happened so rapidly that at present the assimilation of these changes seems to be too difficult a task."

This anxiety about poor familiarity with the resolutions of the 10th Plenum (as well as with the achievements of the Conference on Theory and Ideology) was shared by several speakers. The aforementioned Delegate Gutman put it as follows: "We characterize socialism by its goals, by its inalienable and lasting values, which are as many as nine in number. I wonder how many of us in this auditorium could stand up and define the values of socialism as well as its goals for the present. I think that few can do so, other than professional party workers."

Of a certainty, poor familiarity with the basic documents can be adduced as a reason for the contradictions revealed in the speeches. Some delegates joyfully hailed "the rehabilitation of the Ninth Extraordinary Congress," while others criticized "the disturbing fascination with the Ninth Congress" and others still were worried that the tardy implementation of the party's own programs caused many of its planks to be included in the electoral program of the opposition. Some claimed that there was no reason to worry because the opposition's program is pure demagoguery.

Other delegates wished themselves and their comrades "that we as a whole be a proreform party." Still others added phrases like "a sellout of socialism," claimed that

the PZPR will never settle accounts with Stalinism so long as it does not identify its sources, or felt aggravated by the language of the "Position on Eliminating the Remnants and Consequences of Stalinism in Poland.

The malcontents were chided by one of the speakers, who pointed out that for years they had been fretting about the party's loss of credibility but now after the 10th Plenum and, as one of its consequences, the roundtable, have gained social acceptance, they are grousing, fuming, and grumbling.

Here I perceive certain contradictions, though admittedly the Conference did not abound in dramatic tensions, particularly when compared with the discussions at the 10th Plenum, the roundtable, the Congress of the Democratic Party, or other recent events. The PZPR is clearly striving for an image of a disciplined organization that is united so far as its main ideas are concerned. This certainly has two reasons: first, the desire to persuade its partners [in the PZPR-ZSL-SD coalition] that they can rely on the PZPR, and that the word given by one leadership group will not be overnight withdrawn by another. The second reason is the coming elections. Wojciech Jaruzelski declared in his concluding address. "By being up for the elections, the party by the same token accepts struggle and rivalry [with the opposition]. And the victors in this struggle are those who are united by not only formal-organizational bonds but also the bonds of rallying round a single program, a single general policy. This means that, while existing differences should not be blurred and creative discussion should be continued, we must stand in a phalanx behind our candidates."

Some of the PZPR members realize that their party is being attentively watched, because intraparty affairs are not a matter of indifference in the new sociopolitical reality. As late as in the early 1980s substantial segments of the opposition vengefully followed the principle of "no talking with the Commune," thus denying the PZPR's right to exist. The roundtable has changed many things. A political contract is not signed with shadows: such a contract is signed with real political forces. This reasoning applies to all parties. Professor Zdzislaw Cackowski (rector of the Marie Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin) declared during the Conference, "We walked 'together' a long distance toward this-we, they, the party, the opposition. The party and its allied parties. We started out in this direction, because there was no other way out either for the party or for the [PZPR-ZSL-SD] coalition, or for the opposition, or, this being most important, for Poland."

Therefore, in this new sociopolitical situation the party should present itself as an organization that is not weakened by internecine quarrels. The adoption of this promise harbors cetain perils, however. This was noticed during the 9th hour of the Conference's deliberations by a female delegate from Lublin Voivodship, who demanded the floor and shouted, "Wake up, comrades!

No one is saying what awaits us! Who is reading our resolutions? Let's talk about the future!" Stanislaw Ciosek, then chairing the deliberations, commented on this outcry, "Comrades, after drawing conclusions from the words of our comrade let us resume the topic of our deliberations." Some delegates drew conclusions by having their previously prepared speeches recorded in the minutes of the Conference. As a result, several disputes took place.

Marian Orzechowski polemicized with Heinz Michels (first secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee at the Olsztyn Tire Plants), who claimed, "Our entire ideology was guided and imposed on us by the adversary. Bogumil Ferensztajn parried the attacks on the housing construction policy. Janusz Olszewski (foreman at the PZL Transportation Equipment Plant in Kalisz) disputed certain of the assumptions in the speech by Prime Minister Rakowski, who argued that the government has a complete and clear vision of action. Edward Grzywa (director of the Institute of Industrial Chemistry) criticized the [party's] generalized and too nonchalant attitude toward the coming elections. Differing views were voiced on this last subject. Some delegates chided their own camp for being itself desirous of rapid elections and now, a month before the elections [to the Sejm and the new Senate, on June 4], lacking both an election program and candidates. Others spoke admiringly of the opposition's ability to organize itself so rapidly, while others still accused it of dishonest practices, without however being specific about the facts they had in mind.

All these polemics and verbal clashes became, though, quenched by the mood of mobilization and challenge to action, which dominated the audience. When one delegate appealed for ending the conference ahead of schedule, he gained the support of a definite majority of those present. People were saying to each other that they had enough of martyrdom and wearing sackcloth and ashes. "I can walk in Lodz, in my enterprise, with my head high. I have nothing to be ashamed of as its manager" (Pawel Zawadzki, deputy director of the Confexim Foreign Trade Society). "I belong to the post-Council [following the Second Vatican Council] party, which has, following the Ninth and 10th Congresses and the 10th Plenum, radically changed its program" (Marek Jozewiak, chairman of the National Council of the Polish University Students' Union). "It is time, comrades, to emerge from behind your desks and offices and go to the people. The new type of activist must act differently. I am not afraid to use the expression, 'As a people's tribune" (Zdzislaw Hinz). "It is high time to depart from this Polish Wailing Wall.... Our party does not have to hide itself in corners and implore forgiveness" (Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski).

This orientation was resolutely supported by Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski, "Perhaps this is a kind of shock following the period of the 'propaganda of success.' But if a foreign observer were to follow the discussion at our Conference, he might conclude—now and then only, of

course—that the party, which is now up for such important elections is a party of self-flagellants. We are afraid to raise the visor and reveal our visage, so to speak. We are afraid of speaking firmly about the things of which our party need not be ashamed and which now represent its authentic electoral capital."

To sum up, "Enough words! Enough dilatory debates! It is time for deeds!"

First the elections. Appeals were made for refraining from dispersion of forces, for nominating only two candidates each for each [Sejm] seat allocated to the PZPR. As Jan Bisztyga told TRYBUNA LUDU, in their capacity as citizens, PZPR members may wage their own electoral campaign. But as party members, they are subject to party discipline and to the resolutions of the upper echelons concerning electoral strategy.

Now what next? The answer is contained in the program report of the Politburo to the Second National Conference of PZPR Delegates. Several interesting statements can be fished out of that report. Namely, after years of reading that "the PZPR is returning to Leninist norms," now we read that it is returning "to the democratic ideas of socialism." The PZPR desires to be a safeguard of the socialist identity of our system of society, but "we are finally abandoning the model of the omnipresent party which decides everything and is responsible for everything." The concept of the party's guiding role is slowly disappearing. In its stead there appear the concepts of the socialist state of parliamentary democracy and the civic society, with the parliament as the principal safeguard of the agreements reached at the roundtable.

Within the party itself democracy is now put ahead of centralism. "Discussions and disputes" have gained acceptance by being isolated in a special subsection [of the party program]. A blessing is bestowed on the so-called horizontal agreements [that is, greater autonomy for basic party organizations], and the presence of the PZPR at plants and factories is no longer revered as a fetish. In addition, the PZPR is presenting its own vision of the socioeconomic strategy.

Many of these provisions can also be found in the resolutions of the Ninth Congress and in the texts of the agreements reached at the roundtable, while others define the particular view of the PZPR on these general issues. This refers to the preparations for action in the new conditions of [political] competition, programs, ways of attaining goals, and methods of action.

The basic principles were duplicated in the electoral program of the PZPR. Besides, all the political forces are trying to draft terse and lucid electoral programs. This brevity results in that a comparison of these programs indicates to the voter that, so far as their language is concerned, the elections will not be confrontational. The

unanimity on basic issues is surprising. But an attentive perusal of the programs reveals differences. Let us leave that, however, to free choice by voters.

In conclusion let us point out one more signal. The electoral program of the PZPR refers to a new constitution, which it terms the Constitution of the Republic [instead of the People's Republic], and "which shall become the solid foundation of a democratic, modern, properly governed, and efficient Poland." If I am not mistaken, this is a contribution to the debate on how to name this country.

Various 'Green' Movements Listed, Described 26000475 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 Mar 89 pp 3, 6

[Article by Krzysztof Walczak: "The Greens: Landscape in Motion"]

[Text] The adding on of chairs continued for some time. The organizers did not expect such a large turnout. The planned hour and a half was not enough for the several-minute presentations. The name, region; the number of participants, members and supporters; the program outline, activity, effects and plans—this is a telegraphic form of self-advertising, although, for many groups publicity is unnecessary. They defend and protect their identity, their independence, and generally shy away from institutional forms of activity. But whether they want to or not, they form a mosaic of a very vividly developing movement.

"The Greens." This is a very comprehensive term that shuns stereotypical measures and values and does not lend itself easily to characterization. Undoubtedly, it is a social movement; a typical protest movement. It would be too mild a statement to say that this is a movement of "discontent." This is more of a social protest against the environmental protection policy; criticism of ineffective and sluggish action; disapproval for the inertia exhibited by the authorities and concern for one's own and one's children's future. It is characterized by a clear dominance of feeling of resentment. To a certain extent, this is understandable since the essence of the ecological social movement is putting pressure on the authorities. Self-defense against environmental destruction or, in other words, the movement's dearest values; the drive behind a protest which has difficulty in finding an escape in economic activity. The building of a "clean" industry, waste treatment plants and a cohesive system of environmental protection is, nonetheless, the task and the domain of those in power. If the ecological threat to human life and health intensifies, then criticism is directed toward the authorities, the government, the party.

How many of them are there? The "Green" groups form such a colorful mosaic that precise numerical data are questionable. The 60-year-old League for the Preservation of Wildlife has issued more than one and a half million membership cards. But how many active members are there; how many figureheads or so-called constituent members; children from school circles? How should the PTTK, ZHP and the Consumers' Federation be classified? In the 6-million member OPZZ, there is a 40-member Environmental Protection Subcommittee with one person working full-time. There are a dozen or so persons actively involved in the Environmental Protection Task Force of the 18,000-member PAX Association. Is PAX not a proecology organization? And what about the Democratic Party which involved its political influence at the turn of the decade and contributed to the gaining of independence by the Office and later Ministry of Environmental Protection in government structures?

It is difficult to make a selection of the criteria. Dr Piotr Glinski from the Lifestyles Research Department of the PAN Institute of Philosophy and Sociology estimates that the ecological movement in Poland currently encompasses approximately 100 organizations and 40 groups. He distinguishes 40 proecological organizations (e.g., the LOP, the Polish Ecological Club, the Nature Preservation Guard, the Polish "Greens," the TWWPO "Green Cross" Department) as well as 60 organizations which in their statutory activity take into account ecological problems in addition to other interests and objectives. These include primarily social and professional societies; youth, political, tourist, religious organizations, e.g., the PTTK, SARP, TWP, ZMW, and the Polish Sailing Association. Methodologists also divide groups and, therefore, noninstitutional forms of social activity into two categories: 20 proecological groups (e.g., the "Wole Byc" [I Prefer to Be] Ecological-Peace Movement, the Silesian Ecological Movement, REFA-St Francis Ecological Movement) and as many groups that only take into account ecological problems in their activity (e.g., Freedom and Peace, the Orange Alternative, the Academy of Life).

This classification is also imperfect and debatable. No "Society for the Appreciation of...," no "Friends of..." can repudiate proecological aims in acting on behalf of its own region, town or gmina. Another example: Are Polish "Greens" a group or an organization? At the Founders' Congress in Krakow held on 10 December 1988, there were some several dozen attendees. Registration [of the Polish "Greens"] was not carried out. Well, in that case, let us remain with the classification of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology. Perhaps the law on associations will introduce greater clarity into this. And also perhaps the survey sent out this week by the IFIS Lifestyles Research Institute will enable a better distinction.

The formal alliance of organizations and groups with the Polish ecological movement seems less important to me. This landscape will be changeable. What is of greatest

importance is that during the last 2 to 3 years, the ecological movement has been expanding, frequently assuming forms that break away from any kinds of stereotypes.

The day after the signing of the formal record by the chairmen of the roundtable subcommittee for ecology related matters, which took place in the Warsaw monastery of the Dominican Fathers, an unprecedented meeting took place. For the first time, representatives of several dozen proecological organizations and groups assembled, the majority of which had not had, up to this point, the opportunity for broader self-representation. The organizers of this gathering were Prof Andrzej Sicinski, Dr Piotr Glinski and Dr Anna Wyka from the PAN Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Together with Prof Zbigniew T. Wierzbicki they are the authors of an expertise report evaluating the effectiveness of social activity in the area of environmental protection. Currently, they are conducting studies on the ecological movement in Poland. The invitation to the Dominican monastery was signed by Prof Stefan Kozlowski, chairman of the Environmental and Natural Resources Protection Commission of the Lech Walesa Citizens' Committee.

Against all expectations, this rather sensational meeting assembled representatives of various groups, not necessarily of the opposition. As if in a kaleidoscope, the following were represented: the Polish Ecological Club (invited to the Sejm, visited by political dignitaries from abroad), "Wolnosc i Pokoj" [Freedom and Peace], the Franciscan Ecological Association, the Environmental Protection Committee, "Solidarity" and the "Wole Byc" Ecological-Peace Movement, the Federation of Consumers, the Social Committee for the Protection of the Great Mazovian Lakes (which is a task-solving committee in the RW PRON), the "Czuwanie" [Lookout] Committee from Darlow, the RK PRON Environmental Protection Committee, and the ZMW. It is impossible to mention everyone. However, only these characteristic examples give some idea about the political, social and world outlook cross-section.

The adding on of chairs was of no avail. There simply was not enough room in the monastery hall. And yet, not everyone answered the invitation of the organizers. No one answered the call: "Is there someone here from the League for the Preservation of Wildlife, the Polish-Dutch Environmental Protection Cooperation Society or the "Ecology and Peace" [Ekologia i Pokoj] group?

Without a doubt, the format of the meeting, the address and patronage were not to everyone's liking. However, I would not only look for political implications here. The ecological movement is dispersed. It clearly tries to defend itself against attempts at unification and tries to preserve its autonomy by frequently repudiating any political connections. The well-known representative of the PRON National Council Environmental Protection Committee and the leader of the movement in Warsaw,

Zofia Odechowska, stated at the meeting in the Dominican monastery: "It is very important that a 'cap' not be formed over us." In 1987, the "Wole Byc" group was opposed to the attempt at merging with the Youth Ecological Movement which the state Institute for Youth Problems Research wanted to patronize. However, this same group fought against participation in the meeting sponsored by the Lech Walesa Citizens Committee.

"The line of demarcation between natural cooperation among members of ecological movements with different political views and attempts at political manipulation is in some cases very difficult to establish," writes Dr Glinski in his study. He claims that the so-called Ecological Social Movement created by the PRON Executive Committee in 1986 "has not as yet become a stipulated forum for proecological organizations." Among the 103 formally registered organizations, scientific society institutions, professional associations, various "central unions," strictly proecological organizations constitute a minority. The Polish Ecological Club has maintained the position of observer in the ERS [Ecological Social Movement]. As a confederation affiliated with PRON, the ERS undoubtedly continues to arouse suspicion even among organizations that have joined its ranks.

Any and all attempts at centralization in the Polish ecological movement are doomed to failure. They are unnecessary and harmful. Despite increasingly greater bureaucratization, the ERS has in point of fact never dared to violate the identity and autonomy of fellow sympathizing organizations. Their membership in the ERS was the result of the belief that PRON's position in state structures would facilitate the struggle for resolving the surge of social conflicts, e.g. with regard to "Celwiskoza" of Jelenia Gora or the "Siechnice" Steelworks of Wroclaw. Without a doubt, the ERS has contributed to the signing of the declaration of the "Polish Green Lungs" by the authorities of five northeastern voivodships.

I believe that there is validity in the concern of proecological communities for the effects of the creation of the ERS-PRON "National Environmental Protection Foundation." Dr Piotr Glinski from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, who has greater insight into the problem of Polish ecological groups (I am also making use here of his unpublished study), claims that the National Foundation... in the hands of the ERS may become an instrument of pressure and serve another attempt at centralization and subordination (for example, by way of a policy of fund allocation). Perhaps herein lies the answer to the question where the initiative of the opposition-solidarity side has come from to create a social "Ecological Bank" which was so intensely defended during the roundtable talks.

The agreement reached at the ecological table between the two sides and signed by Prof Jerzy Kolodziejski (government—coalition) and Prof Stefan Kozlowski (opposition—Solidarity) envisages a significantly stronger position for the ecological movement than has been the case thus far. Both negotiating sides came to the round-table with a similar conviction: in order for environmental protection to gain impetus in Poland, the social proecological movement must become autonomous.

The administration of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources also recognizes the partnershiplike qualities of ecological groups. In a statement made to ZYCIE WARSZAWY, which sums up the accomplishments of the ecological "table," Kozlowski mentioned that during the first years of the functioning of this ministry, the ecological movement with its protests and manifests was looked at unfavorably by the ministerial administration. Charges of political undertones came from the lips of "high officials" as well as ironic remarks about the "defenders of flowers, birds and butterflies." The intentions outlined at the roundtable are totally different, i.e., social pressure can only be helpful to the Ministry of Environmental Protection which is functionally weak and weak in terms of decisionmaking and seeking the support of public opinion. Would the disapproval of the minister of environmental protection alone have been enough to close down the "Siechnice" Steelworks?

Social pressure was also at the basis for the creation of an independent ministry. Owing to the initiative of proecological organizations, the following have come about: the League of Cities and Towns on the Vistula [River], the agreement between maritime voivodships, the regional agreement pertaining to issues of restoring ecological order to the Warta River basin, and the "Zielone Pluca Polski" [Polish Green Lungs] agreement between voivodships. The initiators of these organizations come from various opinionmaking milieux. I know by way of example of Jelenia Gora that despite their political disinclination, they have, nevertheless, joined the activity promoted by the PRON. They leave aside their political animosities and are capable of uniting at a moment when there appears to be a chance of winning an ecological issue of primary importance.

For some time now, promoters of subsequent, new structures which are mushrooming have been active in ecological communities. It may be said that there is a "movement in a movement." The debate about the participation of the "Greens" in the parliamentary elections is continuing. The positions with regard to the creating of parties or federations of ecological communities are clearly divided. A considerable part of the groups want nothing to do with politics or with the carrying on of economic activity. After all, in the Polish ecological movement, there are such staunch communities as the "Studio of Live Architecture," the Psychological Training Laboratory and the Zen Buddhism Society.

However, during the last 3 to 4 months, groups have surfaced with certain federationlike characteristics such as the Polish "Greens," the Federation of "Greens," the "Ruch Zielonych" [Green Movement] Independent Party and the Gdansk Ecological Program. All of these bring together representatives of various proecological communities that until now have been connected with totally different organizations which, after all, have not suspended their activity. There is no question that the animation in proecological milieux will radiate throughout the entire country. What effects will this bring? It is probably still too early to predict in view of so many unknowns in the country's changing situation.

On the eve of the inaugural session of the roundtable, a group of ecological activists accepted the so-called Ecological Manifesto'89. The first signatures were those of Profs Jerzy Kolodziejski, Roman Andrzejewski, Stefan Kozlowski and Zbigniew T. Wierzbicki. Several days later, they sat down on opposite sides of the roundtable. They recorded the following in the manifesto: "We represent different philosophies and political outlooks. Today, we are experiencing a state of extreme ecological threat. In the face of real danger, we stand united to take joint action."

Government Responsive to Antinuclear Initiatives 51003005z Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish No 18, 6 May 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Danuta and Aleksander Wroniszewski: "Green Wave"]

[Excerpt] The color green has always been associated with spring, nature, and hope, and lately also with ecology. This year, on the first day of spring, when madders were drowned all over Poland, the Wroclaw movement WiP [Freedom and Peace] (proclaiming a pacifist and ecological program) organized the first legal manifestation in its history. The participants directed by Leszek Budrewicz recalled their ecological slogans; however, primarily this was supposed to be a peace manifestation. WiP members handed flowers to the representatives of law enforcement. The militiamen tried to avoid accepting them for statutory reasons. Budrewicz expressed his hope that in the immediate future the Easter peace march will not be restricted to beating the pavement on Swidnicka Street, but will rather proceed to the Netherlands and Spain.

WiP members in Szcecin prepared such an event for Easter Monday. In the invitations they handed out to anonymous passersby one could read: "We hereby have the honor of inviting you to take part in the peace and ecological Easter March, organized in Szczecin for the first time. Instead of the traditional gluttony and boredom, there will be a holiday walk through the streets of the city proceeding under the slogans 'Europe Without Other Countries' Armies,' 'Poland Without Nuclear Power Stations.' We will announce the route of the march and details of the schedule in special posters after

they are confirmed by the city authorities. We call on you to prepare your own banners, clothing, and other attributes which are in line with the main goals of the march."

In the opinion of many citizens of Szczecin, they have not yet had an event with so many participants organized by a still informal movement. Other informal groupings also took part, including the Federation of Fighting Youth, Solidarity, the POS [Polish Student Organizations], Interacademic Ecological League, and... those who did not quite know. Not only ecological slogans appeared on banners and were chanted during the march.

Several days later, on Sunday, 2 April, ecological protests occurred in Poznan, Pila, Gorzow Wielkopolski, and Wronki. In Poznan, where somewhat earlier the building of the nuclear power station in Klempicz was protested, a peace demonstration was announced. As the Polish Press Agency reported, it ended with the following balance: no arrests, 17 injured law enforcement personnel, and five overworked militia cars.

There were no incidents in the three other cities where protests were held against the construction of the Warta nuclear power plant in Klempicz, except, of course, one attempted battery, or essentially perhaps just intimidation, of a well-known Gorzow journalist, a very active WiP member. A young man with a green band on his arm assumed belligerent poses, and threatened the journalist, who was observing the manifestation, with battery for his unfavorable attitude toward the movement and open lack of fear of nuclear energy.

The Gorzow demonstrators began to assemble next to the cathedral before 10.00 hours.

The banners were unfurled with slogans like "We Do Not Want Klempicz," "We Want Healthy Air, Water, and Food," "Nuclear Power Stations Will Ruin the Polish Economy," "Fewer Power Plants, More Tractors," or "Radioactive Wind Will Blow Away All Doubts."

Meanwhile, doubts surfaced as to who was to walk at the head of the march: the sponsor, i.e., WiP representatives, Solidarity functionaries, who assumed responsibility before the city administration for the conduct of the event, or young people from the so-called RMN [Movement of Independent Youth]. After a short argument, the RMN banner was positioned first.

After mass was said, and Dabrowski's Mazurka [Polish national anthem] was sung, the chanting crowd went in the direction of the high-rise building of the City Administration. While still there, the leaders of groups taking part in the march talked to those gathered, as well as a guest, representative of the Citizens' Committee "The Watch" from Darlowo, who read a petition from the inhabitants of Darlowo to the Sejm (we reported on it in

detail in the fall of last year). In turn, Stanislaw Zytkowski read a resolution passed on 19 March 1989, after the second ecological session held in Gorzow in March, on the topic "Prospects for the Development of Nuclear Power Generation" and "Fears and Dangers." Among other things, the authors of the resolution demanded that the authorities discontinue building all nuclear power stations, and allocate all the funds saved for restructuring industry with a view to reducing its energy intensiveness, as well as make materials of that nature available to independent experts, and provide an opportunity for the opponents of nuclear energy to express their views in the mass media.

There already were 4,000 signatures under the resolution, and Stanislaw Zytkowski announced that signatures will be collected at the gates of plants and churches.

In both Gorzow and Szczecin, they demanded that an all-Polish referendum be held on continuing or discontinuing the construction of nuclear power plants. The protesters also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that, as they see it, the government takes no interest in public opinion on an issue that important, expensive, and controversial.

To be sure, it is controversial to the point that opponents of nuclear power have great differences among themselves as to arguments for objecting to this. For example, the scientists from Poznan point out the side effects of the eventual operation of "Warta" nuclear power station—the drying of soil in Great Poland and destruction of the breadbasket of our country. Others, such as a representative of the legal association "Order and Freedom," argue that the development of this kind of power generation in Poland is unprofitable. They emphasize tremendous costs of construction which hamper other, currently more efficient investment projects, and a relatively short operational life of the power station, costly and difficult waste storage, as well as the fact, brought up by, among others, Stanislaw Albinowski, that several dozen percentage points of electricity now generated in our country are wasted. They admit that Minister [of Industry] Wilczek has recently made several necessary decisions on restructuring, but a well-conceived and stable policy for savings in energy consumption is needed.

The citizens of Great Poland, Lubusko, and Pomerania also state their disbelief in the opportunity for nuclear plants to be safe, all the more so if they are built by the Poles rather than the Japanese or the Americans. They say that in a country in which a decent car, or even reliable forks cannot be manufactured, endeavoring to get "the nukes" is very dangerous.

These apprehensions do not appear absolutely groundless. A TV report, shot by Ireneusz Engler a couple years ago and showing the beginnings of building the Zarnowiec "nuke," remained "shelved," to be sure, perhaps for the simple reason that it showed the entire "generic

quality" of construction: substitute materials, and substitute labor, i.e., prison inmates... In its turn, the report by Eryk Mistewicz in the March 1989 issue of REPORTER on the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Wastes in Rozana paints a shocking picture of 30 years of shabbiness and carelessness. Over the years, the Rozana facility has become much like the forgotten devil in the play by J. Drda. To be sure, the institute in Swierk did regularly ship two drums a week of radioactive wastes taking, however, little interest in what happened to them, and to the employees. The latter, dressed in aprons affording protection from getting soiled, but not from radioactive contamination, tested rarely and unaware of the results of latest tests, were making money on the side selling lead drums at the purchasing facility, and making cast iron drums available to the public.

"The forgotten devil" in Rozana was discovered in conjunction with loud protests against the drafted nuclear burial site in the vicinity of Miedzyrzecze, in Gorzow Province. In June of this year, a special commission certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna will examine the Rozana storage facility. Preparations in Rozana are under way. If the inspection brings a favorable result, then nothing will remain but to believe the assurances of a character in the report by E. Mistewicz that life amid radioactive wastes is as quiet and healthy as at a resort.

Protests against the development of nuclear power generation are not in the least the domain of angry and confrontational young people. At a session of the WRN [Provincial People's Council] councilman Jerzy Hrybacz tabled a motion to convene a session on nuclear energy and the construction of the power station in Klempicz. One day later, this was the dominant extra-agenda topic at the WRN session in Poznan. Councilman Michal Domnarowicz introduced a letter to the minister of industry outlining doubts concerning the construction of Warta nuclear power station. The WRN Presidium transmitted this letter and other documents to Jerzy Bijak, government commissioner for nuclear power generation, who was visiting Poznan.

Meanwhile, the WiP members and others promise protests against nuclear power stations on the first Sunday of every month. The slogan "Clean Energy = Clean Death," indicating lack of confidence in the statements that nuclear power plants are clean and safe, will still remain. "Clean death" inflicted on the people and nature by the accident in Chernobyl will remain the supreme justification. This year, 20 Belorussian villages, in which increased radioactivity continued to occur, were evacuated.

There is no argument that only after the Chernobyl accident has the panic, the fear of this unknown power of the atom become awaken in people. Before 1985, nuclear power stations were first of all synonymous with progress. For example, in the GDR the public demanded

that nuclear power stations be built for ecological reasons, because particle emissions from the coal power plants polluted the air too much.

The citizens of Gorzow or Szczecin protesting the construction of the nuclear power station in Klempicz, removed from them by 100 kilometers or more, are nearer to the already existing nuclear power stations in Eberswalde and Greifswalde. The latter, incidentally built with the participation of young people from Szczecin working there within the framework of OHP [Volunteer Labor Brigades] brigades, is one of the largest in Europe: four reactors are already in operation, and four more are under construction.

In case of an accident and a threat of radioactive contamination, their proximity and the wind rose would be more unfavorable [than] in the case of Warta power station. "Indeed, 80 percent of the winds in Szczecin Province blow from the west and northwest," admits First Secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee in Szczecin Stanislaw Miskiewicz. "However, the case of Chernobyl has shown that distance does not mean safety. The radioactive cloud traveled over Sweden, and subsequently, driven by shifting winds, came partly as far as Swinoujscie and its vicinity, which I could see much later on the maps of radioactive contamination."

The proponents of a clean environment, just as the opponents of nuclear power generation, have recently become more active. By all signs, they will be increasingly many, and increasingly louder, though it is not certain at all that in doing that they will help the government of Prime Minister Rakowski, who accepted environmental protection to be one of his three basic tasks. Thus far, increasingly many citizens gain "knowledge" about nuclear power stations from the protest banners, because there is little official information explaining this field; TV debates of scientists-proponents and opponents of the "nukes" remain in the dimension of declarations by the one side, and wishful thinking by the other. [passage omitted]

Letters Castigate Telephone, Postal Services 26000444 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 14, 8 Apr 89 p 3

[Letters to the Editor by Dr Jan Podoski, Dr Teofil Lijewski, and Andrzej Cebo]

[Text]

From Dr Jan Podoski of Warsaw

The older ones among us remember how well our post office operated in the period between the wars. A letter mailed in Warsaw before noon was delivered to the addressee in Poznan, Lwow, or Krakow the following day, and to smaller towns a day later. Mailboxes were emptied every few hours, and deliverymen who then were called letter carriers delivered the mail twice a day.

In comparison to the prewar period, the number of money orders sent and savings-bank operations of PKO [General Savings Bank] have grown almost tenfold, and the number of telegrams sent almost fivefold. The number of telephone handsets per 1,000 inhabitants has also grown tenfold, although in this respect we continue to occupy one of the last places in Europe. More than two-thirds of the telephone connections are automated, and thus work without manual service.

As a result of its increase in duties, the personnel roster of the Post Office, Telegraph, and Telephone has increased very markedly, from 50,000 in 1938 to 156,000 in 1986, which was surely caused chiefly by the increase in duties of the post office in servicing PKO savings-bank operations, just as has the number of telephones, despite their significant automation.

On the other hand, an interesting phenomenon is the fact that the number of postal pieces, both letters and periodicals, has increased minimally. According to the statistical yearbooks for 1938 and 1987, each inhabitant of Poland received 26 letters and 8 periodicals annually in 1938, and 28 letters and 11 periodicals in 1986. In spite of such small differences, the number of deliverymen has increased from almost 15,000 to 27,000, that is, almost twofold. In these conditions it might appear that postal services should be constantly improving, whereas it is the opposite. With certain resistance, one can reconcile oneself to the fact that letters and postal matter in Poland circulate more slowly than a half century ago, for we have become accustomed to the fact that the standard of service has worsened in all areas, not sparing the post office. On the other hand, the turnover in foreign correspondence looks completely catastrophic. No matter what the point of origin, foreign postal matter reaches the addressee in Poland no faster than within 2 to 3 weeks. The same is true for correspondence sent abroad from Poland.

In view of an underdeveloped telecommunications network, this functioning of the postal links abroad becomes a serious impediment to relations with foreign countries, not to speak of the opinions such slowness creates about our country, discouraging the simplest transactions.

The delay in foreign correspondence, so that news contained in letters is "cooled off," was explainable in the past cold war period, when the idea was to prevent penetration of too fresh news through the border. At present, however, when every PRL citizen can go abroad freely, and satellite teletransmission gave us reception of programs from around the world, this kind of behavior seems not only useless, but downright harmful, not to speak of the costs which attend it.

Unfortunately, none of the scientific-technical organizations united in NOT [Chief Technical Organization] or in other associations includes in its program the functioning of the common post office. The Association of

Polish Electrical Engineers is most closely connected with the problems of communication, but it is chiefly interested in telecommunications, leaving usual postal correspondence to its fate.

This is the main reason which I acknowledged as the basis for my personal appearance and suggestion to the postal authorities that they solve the problem of foreign correspondence as soon as possible. The present state brings harm to the nation's economy and impedes normal mutual relations between people, and for the post office itself is undoubtedly problematical and expensive. A change in the procedure for handling foreign correspondence will not require any expenditures. So at any rate we will try to return to the status of a half century ago in this area.

From Dr Teofil Lijewski of Warsaw

(...) Just now the charges for local calls from my own telephone increased 50 percent, and this is in a situation when one very often gets wrong numbers, and it is impossible to call several districts at all. Calls from public telephones have not become more expensive simply because the coin-insertion system is not adapted for heavier coins (but new lighter coins are already in preparation!). Intercity calls from public telephones have become fiction, for one must insert a 5-zloty coin every 5 seconds or a 10-zloty coin every 10 seconds, and during international calls the average is 20 zloty per second! Who can keep up? At present it is cheaper to take a train to Krakow or to Poznan than to call these cities.

The escalation in postal charges is similar. The charge for sending a book abroad (promotion of Polish culture) sometimes exceeds the value of the book! To make things worse, "super express" services were introduced, both for domestic and foreign mail. What they consist of is that the post office promises to deliver a letter in the normal time limit (that is to say, that in which all letters should be delivered), collecting charges several times higher for this! And still one must go to the designated postal office to pick up this letter personally. Thus the post office makes capital on its own inefficiency!

We may live to see imitations of these practices, for example, the railroad introduces tickets five times more expensive for train trips with no delays, stores will sell meat apart from the queue for a 300-percent surcharge, the ambulance will come at once if a charge of 10,000 zloty is paid for "haste," and so forth. (...)

The post office's crowning argument to all accusations is "lack of people." And what are the hundreds of clerks doing in the Main Post Office buildings on every floor above the ground floor and in the former Ministry of Communications, which changed only its signboard to "General Post Office Administration" and did not vacate even one room? They would be sufficient to man all empty postal windows in all Warsaw.

From Andrzej Cebo of Warsaw

God has inspired you to take the state organizational unit of the Polish Post Office, Telegraph, and Telephone as a "workshop." Personally I think that next to finances, this entity in Poland is the most affected with insanity.

The subject of the article is so very important and timely, since "experts" in communications and telecommunications, horrified by the prospect of an opening on earth and by the anticipated earthquake, are boasting that they are in a position to install 2 million modern telephones in the course of 5 years. Frankly speaking, I took this statement as a bad joke.

The truth is brutal: our post office has not even succeeded in organizing the dispatching of letters, money orders, or telephone connection in the capital of the state situated in the center of Europe. It is better not to speak of national or international telephone services in the third phase of civilizational revolution!

On 27 October 1988 I sent a letter to FRG (near Cologne). The addressee received the letter on 12 December, which is after 46 days.

One's heart bleeds when one sees the lines, empty windows, and premises wasted with impunity, for which the taxpayers must pay.

Significance of Radio Media, Listener Information 26000524 Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish 14 May 89 p 13

[Article by Marek Arpad Kowalski: "The Lovely Cinderella: The Radio Is Becoming a Medium for the Intellectual Elite"]

[Text] As early as 40 years ago the ownership of a radio receiver was a sign of social prestige in many communities, especially when the radio was not the so-called kolkhoznik [a cheap radio] but a set whose dials could be adjusted at will to enjoy programs from a diversity of stations.

Soon afterward the radio became as common a household item as a vacuum cleaner. And once television began to pervade the households, it attracted universal attention, which still continues to this day, and the radio became a sort of Cinderella providing information and entertainment to many. It is available and needed, but the whole family no longer gathers in front of it.

However, radio has the great advantage of not requiring as much physical absorption as television. When turned on, it can accompany a person all day, without restricting his mobility and practically any of his activities. It is perhaps this ease of portage that has caused the radio to be relegated to a secondary plane. Currently, in more and more households television sets are turned on all day without being watched constantly by anyone. Somebody

is saying something on the TV monitor, or something is moving on it, but this does not attract attention. The television receiver is becoming a radio—the point is that it be turned on and signal its presence. By contrast, the radio increasingly often serves to listen to particular broadcasts.

This paradoxical interchange of functions could be used to conclude highly interesting social observations on the culture of the average Pole, but first the actual radio audience should be sized up. And it is smaller than the TV audience. This is surprising, considering that the radio is more convenient to use than television. At any rate, such is the finding of the polls conducted by the OBOP [Public Opinion Survey Center] in June and December of 1988, when it polled 200 persons about listening to radio broadcasts.

Well, the polls showed that the size of the radio audience varies depending on the day of the week. The largest audience, about 71 percent of listeners from among all owners of radio sets, is attracted on weekdays, as compared with 60 percent on Saturdays and only 54 percent on Sundays. As known, the normal weekday schedule does not always permit time for turning the TV set on, especially in the morning or during the work hours. It is then that the radio is the most convenient way of getting information. But Saturday and, especially, Sunday are days of leisure when time permits sitting down in front of TV. On those days the radio is relegated to the role of a Cinderella and television is enthroned.

Definitely the largest radio audience, 57 percent of all listeners, is captured by Program 1. Program 2 accounts for 10 percent and Program 3 for somewhat more, 11 percent. The fewest faithful, 7 percent, listen to Program 4. The remaining radio owners in general hardly listen to the radio.

These figures are confirmed by the amount of time spent on listening to the radio. The average listener spends 129 minutes daily, that is, a little more than 2 hours, on listening to Program 1, or 69 minutes on Program 2, or somewhat longer, 93 minutes, on Program 3. The least listening time, 54 minutes, is spent on Program 4.

This too is a pattern that depends on the day of the week. On weekdays the average radio listening time (regardless of the program) is 106 minutes, compared with a much shorter time, 88 minutes, on Saturdays, and as little as about an hour, 65 minutes, on Sundays.

Just as there is what is professionally termed prime time on television, so on radio there are certain hours of peak listening audience, or "listenability," during the day.

On weekdays the radios are turned on beginning at 0500 hours by 11 percent of listeners, and between 0600 and 0800 hours this percentage reaches as much as 25-27. Between 0800 and 1200 hours this audience gradually

but distinctly shrinks to 9 percent. Thus the radio is a companion at morning toilet and breakfast. Later, as people leave for work, the radios grow silent.

It is interesting that the audience again begins to swell after 1200 hours. It then reaches 14 percent and remains more or less at this level, with fluctuations of up to 10 percent, until 1700 hours. It may be assumed that at that time people who are not gainfully employed return from stores after their morning shopping, while those gainfully employed, following the morning efforts, turn on their radios so that the sound of the broadcasts would lighten their efforts. But between 1700 hours and midnight the radio audience is only several percent (1-6 percent), so far as Program 1 is concerned. The other programs also have their peak audiences at the same hours as Program 1, but these audiences are correspondingly smaller. The prime-time audience for Programs 2 through 4 is 2 to 4 percent of the overall radio audience, and at other hours of the day it is a fraction of a percent.

It is interesting that this pattern also applies on Saturdays and Sundays, when the audiences are generally smaller but also reach their peak between 0600 and 0800 hours (16-32 percent) and remain at some substantial level until 1600 hours (5-18 percent), whereupon they decline to several percent for Program 1. For it is then, after 1600 hours, that television competes with radio.

The other programs, 2 through 4, also rally handfuls of the faithful most often on the same hours on Saturdays and Sundays, with the difference that Program 3 is also popular between 2000 and 2200 hours when its audience rises from a fraction of a percent to 2-3 percent.

Who listens to the radio most often? People in the 25-39 age group. They account for 30 percent of the listeners. Persons in younger age groups account for barely 14 percent, and those in the 40-49 age group, 19 percent. Similarly, those in the 50-59 age group account for 20 percent. Older listeners, those above 60 years of age, account for barely 17 percent. This conflicts with the popular idea that it is the young and the pensioners who chiefly listen to the radio. Thus, most listeners are persons in the prime of life, practically both males (48 percent) and females (52 percent).

In this connection, most listeners have a lower educational background: 43 percent have an elementary educational background and 10 percent a higher one. The remainder consist of persons with vocational schooling (29 percent) and secondary educational background (18 percent).

This is somewhat of a surprise. It would seem that the higher the educational background the greater the proportion of listeners. But it appears that to many people television employs too complex a language, uses many locutions and concepts that are incomprehensible to the undereducated listeners. Radio is superior in the sense of the clarity and simplicity of its broadcasts and their clear diction. As a result of this, news received via radio is

more readily assimilated than that received via television. Hence also radio has more supporters among undereducated persons who want to know what is happening in this country and abroad and understand the information received. A person with higher education does not have to adjust the information transmitter to his level; he will understand equally information transmitted in simple and in tangled language.

This observation is confirmed by an analysis of the occupational makeup of listeners. Skilled workers account for 26 percent; white-collar workers, 17 percent; farmers, 12 percent; and unskilled workers, 4 percent. There still remain those not gainfully employed, chiefly pensioners, who account for as much as 20 percent of all listeners. School pupils account for only 8 percent, and homemakers, barely 5 percent. But the last named apparently spend most of their time in stores, shopping for food.

Generally speaking, the principal radio audience is in the countryside, which accounts for 41 percent of all listeners. Cities with populations of up to 100,000 account for 31 percent, and large cities, 29 percent [as published].

This may be attributed to the technically broader access to the radio than to television in the countryside. Radio broadcasts can be received throughout the nation, without exception. Television does not reach everywhere; there exist areas unable to receive it. However, so far as Channel 1 of television is concerned, it is not accessible on only several percent of Poland's territory. Thus there must be another reason for the greater popularity of radio in rural areas than in cities. That reason is because the so-called infrastructure in the countryside is weaker than in cities. In many small localities the radio remains the principal lifeline to the world and the basic source of access to culture. In other words, wherever cinema, theatre, or at least a house of culture or a library, is absent, the only source of entertainment is the radio (next to television, which however is its only competitor).

Of course, all these figures vary somewhat depending on the particular radio program. For example, the country-side listens chiefly to Program 1, while Programs 3 and 4 are hardly popular there but are popular among urban dwellers. This is linked to the educational level of the audience. Programs 3 and 4 succeed with well-educated persons (who account for about 26 percent of the daily radio audience, compared with 17 percent of such persons for the radio audience as a whole. By contrast, farmers, who account for 14 percent of the daily audience for Program 1, account for only 5 percent of the audience for Program 3. For the proportion of persons with higher and secondary education is higher in town than in the country.

This is linked to the so-called profile of radio broadcasts. Program 1 is a national program, and therefore it is designed for everybody, or more exactly, for the mass audience. Therefore, it cannot resort to linguistic or thematic nuances; it has to be understood by the 38 million inhabitants of this country. This requires selecting broadcasts that would reach everyone, regardless of his educational level and perceptual ability.

Program 2 is possibly rather of an educational nature. It is thus more often listened to by young people, especially by those of school age, because it is addressed to that particular audience.

Program 3 is of a literary nature, and it also includes either classical or entertainment music at a good level. It smacks (in the positive meaning of the word) somewhat of the cabaret, is occasionally laced with abstract witticisms, and requires some intellectual preparation. Therefore, it is most often listened to by young people, and its audience consists chiefly of persons in the 16-40 age group.

Last, Program 4, most sophisticated in terms of both music and language, has its sworn admirers but, as can be concluded from its nature, is addressed to the intellectual elite.

Thus, only Program 1 is tailored to mass audiences. The other programs are conceived to be of interest to particular age or occupational groups. Hence also the small if not insignificant proportions of audiences listening to Programs 2, 3, and 4 are due not to their unpopularity but to adapting the broadcasts to the interests of particular groups.

This is because the period when the radio tried to be everything to everybody is long past. Now it attempts to use selective broadcasts in order to reach everyone, with allowance for the diverse interests of the public. It addresses particular broadcasts to selected groups of listeners, with only Program 1 being reserved for the mass audience. As a result, it has refined its language and method of transmission to a higher level than that of television. The Polish language used on the radio is generally faultless, and the news is communicated logically and coherently without the nonchalance or carelessness occasionally present on television.

Besides, of a certainty, television also is going to cover the same road: from broadcasts for everybody to differentiated broadcasts addressed to particular groups of viewers. This tendency is already observable for some time, if we compare Channel 1 with Channel 2, with the latter channel being more ambitious, requiring greater intellectual preparation, and displaying artistic pretensions [as published].

For the time being, paradoxically, the public views the radio as having become an elitist institution. But then this is the pattern that obtains throughout the world.

Perceiving the beauty of radio requires a connoiseurship that is sensitive to its subtle nuances. By contrast, television must use more cosmetics in order to sell its charms.

Leading Figures Assess Cultural Needs, Dangers

Independent Cultural Forum Declaration 26000486 Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 16, 16 Apr 89 p 1

[Declaration of the Cultural Commission]

[Text] We, the undersigned, having been authorized by the participants in the Independent Cultural Forum to work out the recommendations presented during its deliberations, resolved to publish the following Declaration on their basis:

The situation of Polish culture is alarming and requires fundamental changes, also as regards its financing. The actual subservience of this culture, incorporated in the premises of the political system, was and remains linked to its financial dependence.

The postulated transition to a market-driven economy places artists and culture users in a new position.

Culture must be assured of its essential independence by means of suitable legislation and new financing principles. This should be safeguarded by competent representatives of the artistic community.

Culture cannot be subsidized from the state budget alone. We believe that granting to taxpayers the right to deduct donations for socially useful purposes from their income tax would provide culture with the needed resources and contribute to abolishing the monopoly restricting creative freedom.

We appeal to the Civic Committee under the Chairman of the NSZZ Solidarity to consider taking legislative initiatives in this respect and address suitable proposals to the future Sejm.

Andrzej Wajda, chairman, Cultural Commission

Members of the Cultural Commission of the Civic Committee under the Chairman:

Jacek Bochenski
Kazimierz Dziewanowski
Julia Hartwig
Andrzej Lapicki
Artur Miedzyrzecki

Charter of Polish Culture

We Polish artists participating in the Independent Forum, at a time of a dawning hope for thoroughgoing changes in the social life of our Fatherland, offer a reminder of the liberties and rights binding in all domains of our work and thought.

1. There is one Polish culture, without division into domestic culture and emigre culture, into sponsored culture and culture deserving destruction.

Any artistic or intellectual contribution to the nation, any labor for the sake of the future, should be tolerated and fostered; it should cross boundaries without impediments; and it should manifest itself in the manner proper to it.

In the past years organizational structures in nearly every domain of intellectual and artistic creativity have been destroyed.

The severe crisis degrading our social life, both in terms of culture and in terms of customs, requires unlocking new prospects and abandoning anachronistic forms of political administration.

These structures should be rebuilt on pluralist principles and the freedom of association of artists according to their aspirations and needs should be restored.

Artistic associations, groups, orientations, and teams must be enabled to arise and operate without any overseers, on the basis of an unhampered selection of their participants.

- 3. Freedom of existence must be assured for anything that promotes the creation and dissemination of cultural values, especially the values brought into life by the society and discrete communities, including the artistic community—periodicals, publishing houses, printing plants, bookstores, theatres, concert organizations, libraries, video stores, film studios, television stations, and other institutions serving similar purposes.
- 4. Through common effort the events, works, and figures either forgotten or often deliberately condemned to oblivion should be restored to the social memory.

In our social life the coexistence of diverse intellectual domains of Polish culture is needed.

5. A fundamental change in the present system of education and upbringing is necessary. Schools belong to the society, not to the central government. Teachers should regain the prestige due them as educators of youth and co-creators of culture.

- 6. We wish to express our gratitude to the publishing centers of the second circulation [the underground] and to all persons who, regardless of repressions and confiscations, are engaging in activities promoting Polish culture and its creators.
- 7. In publicizing this Charter we solemnly declare the unity and indivisibility of Polish culture wherever it may develop, in official and unofficial publications and entertainment, in this country and abroad, and in all forms of unimpeded exchange of thought. Full respect for the principles of democracy and tolerance is the highest good and a centuries-long tradition of Polish culture, its generations, and the artistic communities.

'Menu' Announces Broad Goals 26000486 Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 16, 16 Apr 89 p 1

[Text of speech delivered by Jerzy Turowicz at the Independent Cultural Forum, Warsaw, 1 Apr 89: "Culture Can Only Be Independent"]

[Text] We have gathered here at the Independent Cultural Forum. The relationship between these two terms, independence and culture, is of fundamental importance. There is no such thing as a culture that is not independent. A dependent culture, a manipulated culture, a culture turned into a means to an end, a culture subordinated to politics, means a violated culture and the diversion of culture from its basic purposes. Of course, culture exercises a social function, but it exercises it precisely because it is independent.

Let me select just one of the thousand possible definitions of culture. Culture is everything that man builds on nature—on his own nature and on that of the ambient world: works of intellect and of art, technological accomplishments helping man to subject earth to himself, and institutions, laws, and customs. Culture is the environment in which man develops and matures, forms his personality, establishes contact with others, and discovers a hierarchy of values—goodness, beauty, and truth—discovers the meaning of human existence, the meaning of history, and his own place in that history.

If we ask about the state of Polish culture nowadays, we must not forget history, especially recent history. The roots of the culture which arose in our land during the last 1,000 years are implanted in Christianity, in the achievements of the Greco-Roman civilization, and are linked by a thousand threads to what we call the European culture, a living organism developing on tracts ranging from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. During the recent war the Hitlerite occupier intended to destroy our entire culture and turn our nation into a labor force which would not even need reading and writing skills. He failed to accomplish his intention, and one of the forces preventing him was precisely our culture.

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In 1945 we found ourselves in a new situation. The political system established owing to well-known events was linked to an ideology imported from outside and fundamentally foreign to our society, an ideology intended to transform the entire sociopolitical reality and rear a new man. The implementation of that idea required disrupting the bonds linking the present to the entire previous cultural heritage, rejecting what was termed bourgeois culture, rupturing bonds with the West. Of course, a total implementation of that idea would have required resorting to methods employed by Pol Pot in Cambodia. In Poland this was not possible. But the total subordination of culture to politics, especially of the entire domain of education and upbringing, so fundamental to cultural growth, and also of science, as well as a cultural policy administering and guiding the domain of artistic creativity, resulted in a tremendous impoverishment of the cultural heritage, from which only elements suiting the political program were selected. The educational system presented a distorted picture of national history and cultural accomplishments. Artists and scholars adopting attitudes of conformism and opportunism were favored, and restrictions, prohibitions, blacklists, and censorship were applied to independent artists.

I do not mean to say that we have attained no positive cultural accomplishments, no eminent works, during the last 40-odd years. If these accomplishments and works appeared, that was to the credit of people, not the system. Cultural works are not created by an institution or a collective; they are created by the individual, who often creates them despite and often against the reigning system of society. The great world-class accomplishments of our culture such as the poetry of Milosz and Herbert, the theatre of Mrozek and Kantor, the films of Wajda and Zanussi, the music of Lutoslawski and Penderecki, the paintings of Jozef Czapski, the works of Gombrowicz, or the philosophical thought of Leszek Kolakowski, owe nothing to doctrines of socialist realism and their derivatives. It is precisely these works that enable the viewers, listeners, and readers to enter the realm of authentic values, strengthen our national identity, and find answers to questions concerning the meaning of human existence.

What is nowadays the state of culture, of intellectual and spiritual culture, in our country? We have a fairly numerous and valuable intellectual elite that was formed largely owing to resistance to mendacity and duress, owing to often solitary searches of truth. We have a valuable youth which desires to fill in the "blank spots" in its cultural awareness and in its knowledge of the world, to reject slogans and dogmatic jargon. But broad segments of our society have regressed in this respect owing to these 40-odd years of the primacy of politics over culture. The rapid, superficial, and, it can be said, mechanical social and cultural advancement, the commercialization of mass culture, and the subjection of the mass media to the primacy of politics and of the mandatory ideology, have resulted in a marked lowering of the level of cultural needs as well as

in, in some cases, the rise of entire strata of primitivism, if not barbarism. They have caused perils to cultural environment that are no less menacing than the perils to natural environment. As known, the man in the street finds it so difficult to resist the pressure of tendentious propaganda. As Konstanty Idlefons Galczynski says, the man in the street "has a job in that company manufacturing lies, iron, and paper" and complains that "the wind is too rough for his hide."

If a substantial sector of the society resisted this process of degradation, this is to the credit of the often anonymous educators and individuals struggling to protect the cultural heritage and traditions against ravages.

Here the role of the Catholic Church cannot be ignored. We are aware of the tremendous contribution of Christianity to Polish and European culture, of the church's cultural patronage in the past centuries. But while in modern times the relations between the institutional church and culture have not always been the best, nowadays the situation is fundamentally different. This is demonstrated by the experience of the last 10 or 15 years in Poland, by those weeks of Christian culture and those countless cultural, artistic, and intellectual shows and entertainments organized under the patronage and on the territory of the Catholic Church. Following the year 1981 many artists and intellectuals who had previously often distanced themselves greatly from the church, found in the church shelter and a space of freedom which they could not find anywhere else. On coming to the church for purely political reasons, some of them discovered there a spiritual reality previously unknown to them, and they found there answers to the deepest metaphysical questions. These meetings were not always easy. At times, attempts were made to utilize church territory for rallies that were completely inconsonant with the church's mission, and at times, too, parochialism, incomprehension, and mistrust were encountered. But the balance sheet of that experience is, I believe, positive. Now that, in connection with the changes taking place in this country and the recovery of popular sovereignty, it is permitted to hope that culture, too, shall regain the autonomy proper to it, this means that the church's role in culture will certainly change somewhat, but this does not mean that the church should abandon its readiness to serve culture, being aware of the connection between culture and the religious sense of human existence.

The reconstruction of the autonomy of culture, after it had been violated for decades, presupposes reducing the cultural policy of the state to its proper function of providing the optimal conditions for cultural growth, provided that the growth and nature of culture must be decided by artists and not by the officialdom; it must be decided by a kind of cultural self-government.

This also requires integrating the accomplishments of contemporary Polish culture as a whole, bringing to light

the organic relationship between the culture arising in this country and the past and present of the culture developed by emigres and by the so-called second circulation [the underground].

Lastly, the still very slender thread connecting Polish culture with Western culture, or with world culture, also needs reinforcing. The artists and the public, too, have the right of access, and should be provided with that access, to the entire world culture, for it belongs to them, with national culture being part of it. This is no cosmopolitanism. Cultural universalism does not at all blur the identity of national cultures. Shakespeare belongs to the entire mankind, because he is so English, and Dostoevsky because he is so Russian. The basic values that give meaning to man's life are not suspended in some universal sky of abstractions but embodied in the form of particular works that are rooted in the heritage of national cultures. That is why dialogue and exchange, the opening of roads among cultures, is indispensable to their growth. This does not mean, of course, that all Western cultural phenomena should be viewed as positive and valuable.

This concerns not only the international aspect. Within the national culture, too, cultural pluralism is an indispensable prerequisite for cultural growth. If we are struggling for pluralism in social and political life nowadays, we must also acknowledge the right of cultural life to pluralism. This must mean the presence of many artistic and intellectual currents, schools, and tendencies, and their constant interaction based on mutual respect and tolerance. Thus must mean the belief that spiritual, intellectual, and artistic culture, or what has been termed the superstructure, is not a fringe luxury of human existence but the complete self-fulfillment, crown, and purpose of that existence. For only an independent culture created in a climate of freedom helps man to transcend himself, to uncover the meaning of his existence, to follow his calling, and to make the world more human.

ROMANIA

Orthodox, Catholic Leaders Express Support for Ceausescu

27000061 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 15 Apr 89 pp 4-5

[Excerpts] The plenum of the National Council of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front took place on 14 April, under the chairmanship of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and chairman of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front. The speakers included Nestor Vornicescu, Metropolitan of Oltenia, and Bishop Ioan Robu, head of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Bucharest. [passage omitted]

Address by Metropolitan Nestor Vornicescu

As part of our mission and impelled by the commandments of patriotic Romanian consciousness, we wish to express today, at this plenum of the National Council of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, our total support for and active participation in implementation of the grandiose programs under discussion in this high forum of our democracy, programs for all-round economic and social development of our beloved country, socialist Romania.

In unison with all those who are represented here, please allow me, in the name of the Romanian Orthodox Church and of all religious denominations of our country which, as an expression of the highly democratic nature of our society, are members of the National Council of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, to give expression to the most elevated sentiments of deep respect and high esteem which we cherish for you, eminent leader of our nation, founder of modern Romania, and untiring promoter of peace in the world and of understanding and cooperation among men and peoples.

While paying you the most resounding homage now, as the Romanian nation celebrates the anniversary of your election as the first president of Romania, I ask that you please accept on this solemn occasion our profound thanks for the constant concern you personally display for the all-round economic and social development of the country and ongoing improvement on this basis in the material and spiritual standard of living of the people, given concrete expression among other things in modernization of all the localities of the country, in the increase in wages and pensions which millions of workers have received and will receive, and in the extensive programs for construction of housing and sociocultural buildings which cast revealing light on the humanism which characterizes contemporary Romanian society.

I assure you, esteemed Mr President, that, despite the slander making itself heard in certain ill-disposed circles abroad, at all times foes of the Romanian people, we support with all our strength the current modernization of the communes and villages in the various regions of Romania, a modernization which obviously is contributing to improvement in the standard of living of the working peasantry, toward a degree of civilization increasingly reducing the differences between town and countryside. The process of modernization of the rural localities of our country, which has been approved by the democratic forums of the people, has been determined by the need for creating conditions suitable for a prosperous life, for education, cultural, medical care, and comfort for rural residents. We support this process by word and by deed, knowing as we do that in addition to modernization of life in all its aspects it contributes to preservation of all the most valuable creations of our glorious past in art and architecture, including the ecclesiastic, in everything that constitutes our national cultural heritage.

It is with special joy and a profound sense of patriotic pride that I have learned that, starting at the end of March, our country no longer has to pay foreign debts. This is a fact of enormous importance, with far-ranging domestic and international implications, one which all of us view, esteemed Mr President, as yet another brilliant success of your wise policy for affirmation and defense of the full independence and sovereignty of Romania.

The entire conduct and exemplary good sense of our people and its moral principles attest that our expression of our desire and effort for unity in spirit and in deed can by no means represent empty words.

We living today, knowing whence we have come and whither we are going, aware of the values of the past and having a clear vision of the future, as is proved also by the programs presented and discussed today and by events taking place every day, affirm and reaffirm our total support, as ministers and faithful of religious denominations, in the noble capacity of loyal citizens of socialist Romania, for the patriotic aims of our entire people.

I should also like to take this opportunity to assure you, highly esteemed Mr President, Nicolae Ceausescu, as metropolitans, clergy, and faithful of the Romanian Orthodox Church, inspired by sentiments of profound patriotic pride in the great achievements of the people, in the bright future opened up for the progress of our society and powerfully mobilized by the appeals and by the example of your life and work, that, unanimously approving as we do all the documents submitted to our plenum, we will act with devotion and self-denial, together with the entire people, to make our contribution to continuing elevation of our beloved homeland, the Socialist Republic of Romania, and to its ever stronger development in the assembly of nations of the world.

Address by Bishop Ioan Robu

It is a special honor to me at this forum, which has brought together all the representatives of our society, to express to you, Mr President, Nicolae Ceausescu, on behalf of the Catholic clergy and faithful of Romania, heartfelt regards for all that you are doing to further the welfare and prosperity of the country and of the entire people.

We are all sons and daughters of this country, irrespective of ethnic origin and of our philosophical or religious concepts, and we all have the same rights and obligations. Our country rears and nourishes us all according to the contributions we make to its development and prosperity. Our Catholic Church makes a specific contribution in this context to the good of the Romanian people. The stronger and more prosperous the country, the better the our lives will be—together and each of us singly. Hence, highly

esteemed Mr President of the Republic, we all support the programs for all-round economic and social development of the country submitted for discussion and approval by the plenum of the National Council of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front. But, as has rightly been stated here, these programs, however good they may be, represent nothing if they are not carried out. Hence we ministers of the Church, together with our flocks, join in the work of the entire people so that all these programs may become reality.

The speaker went on to state the following: As a result of the care bestowed by our government and of your untiring efforts, much esteemed Mr President of the Republic, all citizens in Romania have work and all can develop and apply their creative capacities. As a person who has traveled and continues to travel much around the world, even in the most advanced countries I have seen men looking for work for days and years on end, hungry and unclothed, sleeping in the open. I am thus in a position to reject the words of those ill-informed, ill-disposed, or downright hostile persons who slander us or try to give us advice about the way we order our affairs in our own garden but fail to look into their own.

So it is that, all the slander to the contrary notwithstanding, our country has managed a performance which many surely covet: Romania no longer has foreign debts. Together with the ministers and faithful of our Catholic Church, I also join all those sons of the country who address the most heartfelt thanks to you for this and for all that you do for the progress and prosperity of the country.

As loyal citizens of the country we again affirm on this occasion our support for all the programs submitted to the council for discussion. I should like to point out something that is obvious to all of us who live in Romania, namely, that the plan for modernization of localities and area development, which as we know has been implemented for many years now, pursues the aim of creating better working and living conditions for all the residents of localities, ones worthy of the era of civilization in which we live.

We also unreservedly support the foreign policy of disarmament and peace, of broad cooperation with all the peoples of the world, with all those who love life, those who want the marvelous creation that is man to survive and to have an assured future of tranquility and understanding with his fellow men.

It was raining when I arrived at this meeting, and with your permission I should like to share with you my thought about rain, expressing it in the form of a wish: May grace and happiness be rained constantly upon our country and our people.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

JAK-38 Technical Data Published

24000131a Prague ATOM in Czech No 3, 1989 p 13

[Unattributed report: "Soviet Vertical Takeoff and Landing Aircraft]

[Text] The origin of the Soviet Yak-38 (Yak-38MP) falls in the early 1970's. The first mass-produced models of this aircraft were placed on the deck of a Kiev class anti-submarine cruiser, he Yak-38 is a stationary, multipurpose V/STOL type on-board aircraft. It is distinguished by its compact construction, with small, midmounted, delta wings with a 45-degree leading edge. Large, single-slotted flaps are on the inside parts of the trailing edge and, as is characteristic of on-board aircraft, the exterior ends of the wings fold upward. The long. oval fuselage of half-shell construction is, similar to the wing, manufactured principally from light aluminum alloys. The conspicuous, integral air ducts with outerlayer dividers lead to the main fuel sub-unit. Tight behind the cockpit, on the upper part of the fuselage, is the cowling of the elevation engines; in the lower segment is a two-part hatch for access to the jets of the elevation engines. The fuselage ends at the tail with an angular verticle stabilizer and a simple horizontal stabilizer. The aircraft has a combined propulsion unit, made up of the main jet engine, Lyulka AL-21 in the rear section of the fuselage with one pair of pivoting exhaust jets, whose thrust is balanced by the thrust of two auxiliary Kolesov lift motors, installed vertically, in tandem, behind the cockpit. The cockpit has an ejection seat, and standard instrumentation with forward-view display. Basic avionic instrumentation is comprised of fire-control radar and an automatic guidance system for vertical take-off and landing with a stable change-over to horizontal flight.

Variable ammunition is carried on four wing pylons with a maximum capacity of 3600 kg. It can be formed of AA-8 short-range air-to-air missiles, AS-7 air-to-surface missiles, the GSh-23 23 mm twin-barrelled cannon in a cannister, 57 mm multiple rocket launchers (UB-16-57) or classical bombs of up to 500 kg.

The combat uses of the Yak-38 are wide, it is used for reconnaissance, air defense for ships, combat with surface ships, and even in support of naval air assault units. A squadron of 12 aircraft is placed on each of four anti-submarine cruisers, the Kiev, Minsk, Novorosiysk, and the Baku. In the NATO code this aircraft is called the FORGER.

Tactical Technical Data on the Jak-38

Wing-span	7.3 m (chord 4.9 m)
Length	15.5 m
Height	4.4 m
Wing surface	18.5 m ²
Takeoff weight without armament	7700 kg
Maximum takeoff weight	11,700 kg
Maximum thrust of main motor	80 kN
Maximum thrust of auxiliary motor	2 x 35 kN
Maximum velocity at sea level	0.8 M
Maximum velocity	1.05 M
Maximum rate of ascent	4500 m/min-1
Ceiling	12,000 m
Tactical range	370 km 13451

HUNGARY

Legitimacy of Soviet Troops in Hungary Disputed 25000240b Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 29 Apr 89 pp 4-6

[Article by Endre Babus and Andras Peto: "Partial Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Hungary: There Is Only One Homeland"; "The Forgotten Army," interview with Peter Gosztonyi conducted by Florian Mezes; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] What legal basis exists for the stationing of Soviet military forces in Hungary? How long can a Soviet military contingent stay temporarily in Hungary and how large can it be? Among other matters we tried to obtain answers to these questions at last week's press conference. As it turned out, many of these issues are still shrouded in secrecy.

It is difficult to locate the 1957 Budapest agreement concerning the situation of Soviet troops in Hungary. Legal codes published during the past decade no longer include the text of this agreement. In picking up, for example, the 6-volume Compilation of Legal Provisions in Force [HJGY] 1945-82 edited by former Justice Minister Ferenc Petrik and his associates, one can see for oneself that presumably for the sake of saving paper, no place was left for international agreements in the 5,200 page compilation.

Similarly, we would be looking in vain in the compilation of International Agreements 1945-82 published in 1985. The editors of this volume wanted to present the more-than-100 most important foreign policy treaties of the post World War II era, but could not justify publishing the Soviet-Hungarian agreement signed by Foreign Ministers Imre Horvath and Andrei Gromiko, and by Defense Ministers Geza Revesz and Georgii Zhukov on 27 May 1957. By now this agreement has been removed from Hungarian legal consciousness to an extent that last Friday the Hungarian state secretary for defense was shocked to hear reminders to certain provisions of the

agreement at a press conference concerning the removal of Soviet troops. Colonel General Lajos Morocz could not understand how a civilian journalist could put his hands on an agreement he believed to be top secret.

This agreement is no secret, however. By doing some research one may retrieve it for example from the 15 September 1957 issue of MAGYAR KOZLONY, moreover, even from the 1977 edition of HJGY 1945-77. The three page, 19 paragraph agreement provides a typical legal framework. It does not fix, for example, the number of Soviet troops in Hungary, nor does it state the places where they are to be stationed. The parties to the agreement delegated these issues to be dealt with in separate agreements. The same approach was chosen in regard to the barracks, warehouses, air fields, and practice fields used by Soviet forces, and regarding the order in which transportation and communications systems are utilized. Similarly, the four ministers left prescriptions governing objects constructed by Soviet troops subject to separate agreements. If they exist at all, these separate agreements are truly secret: they are not part of any published Hungarian compilation of legal provisions.

So what then are the provisions the 32-year-old agreement proclaimed by virtue of Decree Having the Force of Law No 54 of 1957 concerning the so-called temporary stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary? The agreement starts out by justifying the stay of the alien forces in Hungary in terms reminiscent of the Iron Curtain era: "... there exists an aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], the rearmament of West Germany is in progress. There forces desiring revenge, and the forces of the United States of America and of other NATO member countries maintain a large number troops and military installations in the vicinity of socialist states." The framers of the agreement found it necessary to declare in the very first article of the agreement that Soviet troops will not interfere in the domestic affairs of Hungary. Soviet troop movements outside the posts where they are stationed are subject to the consent of the Hungarian Government, or of an organ authorized by the Hungarian Government, according to the agreement. But once again, the published text of the agreement does not specify conditions for the issuance of such permissions. At the same time the agreement provides as a matter of general rule that Hungarian authorities have the right to adjudicate criminal actions and rule violations committed by Soviet soldiers and their family members, according to Hungarian law. The exceptions in this regard are violations of law committed by the Soviets against each other and against the Soviet Union, as well as cases violating [military] duty obligations. Soviet authorities have jurisdiction in such cases.

The final passage, Article 19 of the agreement provides for the term of the agreement. This provision reveals that the mandate of Soviet troops stationed temporarily in Hungary calls for an indefinite period. And the agreement may be changed only with the mutual consent of both parties.



Locations of Soviet Troop Removal

Would it not be a timely task to change the agreement signed 32 years ago so that it calls for a definite period time, the reporter of HETI VILAGGAZDASAG [HVG] asked at last week's press conference concerning the partial removal of Soviet troops. This kind of change would not be unprecedented in the framework of East European military cooperation, because even the Warsaw Pact calls for a fixed term (first it called for 20 years of cooperation, then for 10 years, and in 1985 it was extended for another 20 years). At the press conference the HVG reporter also inquired where the special agreements were concerning the number of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary and their station posts, as well as where the agreements providing rules for the Soviet military use of Hungarian real estate and movables could be found. Similarly, we made an attempt to find out when and how the 62,000-65,000 Soviet contingent mentioned in recent months has changed during the past decades. Finally we asked state secretary Morocz and the commander in chief of the Soviet Southern Command Matvej Burlakov whether they envision a possibility for the removal of all Soviet troops from Hungary prior to dismantling both NATO and the Warsaw pact, since both of these blocs have member countries where no foreign troops are stationed.

We received laconic answers to our questions. State secretary Morocz revealed this much: during the past 32 years there was no need to modify the Soviet-Hungarian military agreement. We were unable to find out to which of the possible agreements this statement applied to. Accordingly, whether there exist secret Soviet-Hungarian agreements concerning the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary, and if so, what the contents of such agreements are continues to be unknown.

One may know however, that after the partial troop removal which is now beginning, and which involves 10,400 soldiers, 50,000 Soviet soldiers will remain in Hungary, and that this force—based on conclusions

reached from data partially published—will continue to have jurisdiction over several dozen barracks, several hundred warehouses, a few thousand apartments and over many hundreds of thousands of acres of land. One may also be aware of the fact that by now, an issue which involves the foundations of the country's sovereignty. such as the stationing of foreign troops, can be by no means an issue pertaining exclusively to narrow political bodies, the cabinet and the Presidential Council. If Hungary indeed wants to become a constitutional state in which the central place in politics is occupied by Parliament, obviously, sooner or later Parliament will have to decide concerning the stationing of foreign troops in Hungary as well as of related conditions. And such decisions should be made in the form of publicly proclaimed laws.

Data and Hopes

On Monday [24 Apr], the day before the partial Soviet troop withdrawal began, foreign affairs state secretary Gyula Horn termed the simultaneous dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and NATO as a goal that can be accomplished prior to the millennium. Even until that takes place it is a fundamental [requirement] that we endeavor to have a "consulting rather than a coordinating relationship," Horn said. As a result of the Vienna negotiations of the 23 [nations], all Soviet soldiers may depart Hungary during the first half of the 1990's, according to Horn.

In the course of partial Soviet troop withdrawals that began in Kiskunhalas on 25 April, a total of 22 military units will be removed by May 1990, thus reducing the 65,000 Soviet troops stationed in Hungary by 10,400, (even though they are mentioning a 25 percent reduction). Altogether, some 900 apartments, 19 barracks, 13 messes, 200 vegetable storage facilities, and other buildings will be made available. Out of the military machinery and weaponry 450 tanks, 200 guns and trench mortars, and more than 3,000 vehicles, and other equipment will be destroyed or removed beyond Hungary's borders.

The Forgotten Army

"In what way did Soviet troops in Hungary 'develop' since World War II," our reporter asked military historian and director of the East European Library Peter Gosztonyi (age 58) in Bern.

[HVG] Toward the end of World War II Hungary was considered as part of the Soviet sphere of interest. Did the 4-power agreement guarantee the time when Soviet soldiers would leave Hungarian territory?

[Gosztonyi] I must dispel at the outset a very frequent misbelief: It is not true that in Yalta they made Hungary a part of the Soviet sphere of interest. The minutes of the Yalta conference mention Hungary perhaps twice, and always by saying that after the end of the war free elections would have to be held in Hungary. Yalta dealt mainly with Poland, with the Westward shift of the Polish border, with the recognition of the government in exile, and with the future of Germany.

[HVG] But isn't there a famous "scrap paper" according to which Hungary is part of a zone subject to Soviet influence?

[Gosztonyi] The story involving the "scrap paper" took place in Moscow, October 1944, not in Yalta. It involved a separate agreement between the Soviets and the British, but it was in force only for the duration of the war. According to that separate agreement Romania would be 90 percent under Soviet, and 10 percent under British influence, in Bulgaria the division would be 75 to 25 percent, in Yugoslavia 50-50, in Greece 10-90. Influence over Hungary was initially divided on a 50-50 basis, but two days later it was modified to 75-25 percent in favor of the Soviets. Soviet literature denied the existence of the scrap paper for many years, and Churchill called it an exaggeration at most. Nevertheless, I did find the scrap paper in the central archives of London. Incidentally, both parties complied with the agreement. For example, after occupying Bulgaria, Soviet soldiers believed that they would continue going on to Greece. Stalin stopped and redirected them toward Belgrade, however. But as I said, the scrap paper was valid only for the duration of the war.

The next time Hungary came into question was in Potsdam, July-August 1945. There they decided the deportation of Schwabians residing in Hungary, the confiscation of German property in Hungary, as well as the holding of free elections, which actually took place on 4 November 1945. The Paris peace treaty signed in 1947, which actually restored the Trianon borders except for three villages, gave transit and security rights to Soviet units in Romania and Hungary in the direction of Austria. From the viewpoint of military policies the foundation for this decision was that the four powers, including the Soviet Union had troops stationed in Austria, and the supply and movement of these troops by railroad and truck convoys had to be secured and directed by Soviet troops while transiting Hungary. Apparently the Hungarian peace delegation failed to notice that the agreement did not specify the permissible size of Soviet troops in Hungary, and the treaty does not state when, how and where the troops can be moved. According to the peace treaty, and except for the aforementioned security forces, the Soviet Army would have to be removed from Hungary within 90 days from the date the treaty is signed. They did move, but ever since that time we have no accurate data as to how many troops remained under the pretext of [transit] security.

[HVG] Later on, however, all four powers removed themselves from Austria. Why did the Soviets fail to move out of Hungary? [Gosztonyi] The Austrian state agreement was signed on 15 May 1955. According to the agreements the Soviets had to leave Austria by the end of September. They indeed left Austria, but not Hungary. It is true though, that one day before the Austrian state agreement came into being they signed the Warsaw Pact, and this pact does not say a word about stationing troops in other countries. All it provides for is the establishment of cadres. Although it was mentioned that in the "near future" a bilateral interstate agreement would govern the status of Soviet troops in Hungary, such an agreement did not come into being. This was the basis of the 1956 Hungarian demand for the removal of Soviet troops. After all, the removal of Soviet troops from Austria negated the reason for stationing Soviet troops in Hungary.

The truth is that one cannot tell what actually happened between September 1955 and May 1957, when Zhukov came to Budapest to negotiate a Hungarian-Soviet interstate agreement providing for the temporary stay in Hungary of the Soviet Southern Command. When Janos Kadar spent two weeks in Moscow in March 1957 they supposedly discussed also this matter, but this period of time and the perhaps still existing documents would have to be researched in order to find out exactly what happened.

[HVG] Did the issue of why Soviet troops are stationed in Hungary in times of peace ever come into question before international forums?

[Gosztonyi] Never. The issue was not raised after May 1957 because thereafter Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary on the basis of an agreement reached by two governments which were recognized as legitimate. And frankly speaking, the West was not interested before 1957 either in what happens to the East of the River Lajta. No one had any problems with the Russians in Hungary, not counting the time when in October 1956 we demanded that they leave the country. For example, even Imre Nagy renounced the Warsaw Pact only after 31 October when more and more Soviet units entered the country. Namely, the Warsaw Pact permits troops to enter another country only if those troops are invited by the government. The Imre Nagy government did not invite them. There were no anti-Soviet sentiments during the popular uprising, so much so that no harm was done at all to captured Soviet soldiers. And following 30 October, when Soviet forces left Budapest, they simply let the captives go by saying: "now go after your own!"

The Changing Doctrine

Whenever the partial removal of troops comes into question, Hungarian and Soviet military circles stress that the number and preparedness of Soviet troops remaining in Hungary will be consistent with the principles of "rationally adequate defense." They emphasize that this term means defense against the NATO Southern Command. Could it be that this is the sole task of the Soviet Armed Forces stationed temporarily in Hungary? Or do they want to continue to sustain the principle referred to in the West as the "Brezhnev Doctrine"? A few weeks after the 1968 joint march into Czechoslovakia the then executive secretary of the CPSU had this to say in Warsaw about the "limited sovereignty of East European countries": "It is beyond doubt that the people and the communist parties of socialist countries have and must have the freedom to determine their own developmental path. But not a single decision they make may violate socialism within their own countries, nor can it be contrary to the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, or of the international workers' movement. This means that every communist party is responsible not only for its own people, but also for every socialist country, for the entire communist movement."

Hopefully, the days when these sentences were appropriate have passed. But in order to be certain that this is indeed so-because of Berlin 1953, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979—one must obtain daily affirmations. One may consider Mikhail Gorbachev's oft quoted statement as such declaration: by the year 2,000 the Soviet Union will withdraw all of its troops stationed on foreign land, and he recommends the same to NATO, the other party. Gorbachev's statement during Karoly Grosz' last visit to Moscow was clear: According to news agency reports he ultimately drew a line between himself and the military interventions in Hungary, 1956 and in Czechoslovakia, 1968. He stated that "It must be guaranteed to a maximum degree that external force is not used in resolving the internal affairs of socialist countries."

At the same time, in response to a question concerning the possible neutrality of Hungary, Soviet Col Gen Burlakov had this to say at last week's press conference: "in this regard the organs having jurisdiction, the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Pact would render a decision."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Termination of Party Membership Proposed on Basis of Interviews

24000138 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 May 89 p 3

[Interview with Jan Brozman, senior secretary, and Vojtech Pekarik, secretary of the CPSL [Communist Party of Slovakia] District Committee, by Jaroslav Vavrinec, editor of Bratislava PRAVDA; date and place not given; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Between February and April, the Prievidza District party organization held roundtable discussions in preparation for this year's annual member meetings of CPSL factory organizations, plenary meetings, and party conferences. Since most organizations have already finished these discussions our editor, Jaroslav Vavrinec, decided to talk about their outcomes with Jan Brozman, senior secretary, and with Vojtech Pekarik, CPSL district committee secretary.

[PRAVDA] What was the attitude of basic party organizations to these roundtable discussions, and how did they conduct them?

[Pekarik] We have been holding roundtable discussions since 1972 with members and candidate members of the party, though not always as extensive as the current ones. This has been one of the forums that we have used since 1970, after the crisis period in the party and society. We have been monitoring and evaluating how well party members fulfill the specific tasks assigned to them at these discussions. These meetings have customarily been held prior to the annual conferences. We are monitoring task fulfillment. Our position is that when either a member or candidate member of the CPCZ has no specific goals, he can accomplish everything or accomplish nothing. It is necessary to assign a goal to every communist. This makes it easier to organize work within organizations, and to focus member efforts on those areas and tasks that are most critical.

[PRAVDA] Why did you decide to hold these discussions between February and April? Did committees have enough time to prepare for them?

[Brozman] The district committee presidium recommended that organizations hold the roundtable discussions with communists at this time so that they would have enough time to prepare for the subsequent annual meetings. There were differing opinions as to the scheduling. The point is, however, that the discussions accomplished their objective: they motivated the individual communist. This also provided us with members and candidate members who share a standard, serious attitude, above all to their own work, who will ask whether he or she, as communists, are satisfied with performance in the work-place, where they live, whether or not his or her social involvement is commensurate with the needs of the time,

whether he or she is doing enough to facilitate restructuring. We wanted each member and candidate member to commit themselves openly to the activities of the committee, of supervisory party agencies. Above all we wanted them to analyze what gives them the most difficulty at the workplace, and how to proceed.

[PRAVDA] The results of these roundtable discussions should become a springboard for content and personnel preparations for annual meetings and party conferences...

[Brozman] It is essential to evaluate objectively the results of these roundtable discussions, because member opinions provide the most profound view on the work of the organization itself, on its political and economic activities. In particular, critical comments from members hold a multitude of suggestions that can be implemented.

[PRAVDA] How were the roundtable discussions held within organizations?

[Pekarik] In large party organizations two or three committee members were assigned to party groups. Sometimes a communist senior manager was also present. In smaller organizations for the most part all committee members were present. In basic organizations in towns and larger villages representatives of the town and local committee, the district committee, and sometimes communist chairmen of National Front organizations participated in the roundtable discussions.

[PRAVDA] Did all communists express their opinions?

[Pekarik] No, we cannot say that every member or candidate member has expressed his opinion. Most think that their opinions are incorrect, and do not want to communicate this to others, and therefore choose not to express themselves. There were also instances when certain party members found themselves in the position of accusers. Why doesn't the Central Committee do this or that, why doesn't the government act this way and not that way, why didn't the regional or district committee take another position, why didn't an enterprise director take care of this or that. Few communists offered self-criticism of their own work. We found greater openness in CPSL factory organizations for production entities, especially in such organizations in the Slovak Coal Mines. In the other discussions, even though they were not lacking in openness and criticism, more attention was paid to correct formulation and stylization, and less attention was paid to the content. That approach, however, will not bring about improved quality of party work.

There were also expressions of extreme opinions. These occurred mainly in organizations made up mostly of older party members. These groups demanded an acceleration of restructuring, and suggested many unjustified

personnel changes. They are afraid that if we continue with restructuring at the current pace we will miss something, will not manage to do things in the manner in which they should be done.

[PRAVDA] Were there also cases where members became afraid to accept new tasks?

[Pekarik] This has also happened. But the same way that one enters the party—one does not join on one's own but must be accepted—so it is with leaving it; one does not just leave but is expelled or his membership is revoked. Committees recommended that some 80 members either have their memberships revoked or be expelled from the party, mainly for long-term passivity.

[PRAVDA] Roundtable discussions with communists are related both to preparations for annual meetings and to the further strengthening of the membership base...

[Brozman] The committees have formed an impression of the attitude of every communist. This will help them make decisions as to who to recommend for what party function. The political and professional growth of communists, however, is not a matter solely for a party committee, but also for senior managers. After all, a foreman or other manager is actually the person most concerned about the political makeup of his collective, and its way of operating.

Nuclear Power To Replace 20 Percent of Coal Mining by Year 2000

24000124a Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech No 11, 17 Mar 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Prof Eng Antonin Krumnikl, doctor of science, minister of Fuels and Power of the CSSR: "20 Percent Less in the Year 2000"]

[Text] I have recently encountered a question that can be briefly summarized as follows: "Why is coal output not declining, and why is it not projected to decline in the near future even though more and more power is being generated by nuclear power plants?" It should be stated by way of introduction that the question phrased this way does not get to the heart of the matter. Coal output is declining, though not yet as rapidly as we had planned. The question, however, does force us to think a little more deeply about the role of coal in our fuel and power balance and about its future development.

The exploitation of an adequate supply of coal was one of the basic pillars of our country's industrial development. During the building of the post war country one of the basic assumptions was that industrial development would be based on inexpensive energy generated by coal. Until roughly the mid-1960's coal occupied almost a monopoly position as an energy source. It served as a fuel, to generate electricity, and also to produce coal gas

and synthetic gasoline. The end of the 1960's brought the first significant change, caused by increased crude oil use. This was followed by increased use of natural gas.

Currently we are in the midst of a second period of great structural change, this time caused by increased use of nuclear power. Coal extraction peaked in 1984, and since that time has been declining, mainly because of a decline in the extraction of brown, power coal. Table 1 shows this clearly.

Table 1. Development of Coal Extraction (million tons)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
State plan	98.8	100.4	97.2	97.0	94.5	95.2	93.8
Actual	102.9	100.4	100.8	100.4	98.0	_	

The need to very significantly exceed planned extraction targets came about mainly because of excessive electricity consumption by industrial users, the need to compensate for decreased imports of electricity from the USSR after the Chernobyl disaster, and the severe weather conditions that we experienced in the first years of this 5-year plan. In the closing years of the current plan we continue to anticipate actual coal extraction to moderately exceed extraction targets in the event that severe weather conditions again force us to increase deliveries to consumer inventories or to increase electricity production.

Intensification should be the main characteristic of future Czechoslovak economic development. Intensification efforts should result, among other things, in a significant decline in the energy intensiveness of our national economy. The guidelines of the 17th CPCZ Congress project a 33 percent reduction in energy intensiveness between 1985 and the year 2000.

A critical element in reaching this goal is a change in the production structure of Czechoslovak industry, involving the implementation of progressive technologies and the limitation of materials and energy intensive products. Because of existing production assets and facilities, however, these changes cannot be accomplished during a single 5-year plan. Therefore the Eighth 5-Year Plan was designated as the time to begin this complicated process with its inevitable impact on the power generation balance of the country and the very development of our fuel and power base.

In contrast with previous periods, which saw increases in domestic consumption of primary power resources that averaged 10-12 million tons of standard fuel equivalent over a 5-year plan, drafts of the Eighth 5-Year Plan projected reductions in this increase to the 4 million tons of standard fuel equivalent range. This increase was slated to be covered by imports of natural gas and by electricity generated by nuclear power plants. Crude oil

imports were projected to remain stable, and coal extraction, especially of brown coal, was projected to decline moderately. Growth in the production sphere was projected to be small or nonexistent, leaving most of the increase for the general public.

When planning a strategy for developing the Czechoslovak power balance through the year 2005 we based our discussions on recent development trends, primarily those of the Eighth 5-Year Plan, and on projections for 1990. This period has been characterized by our failure even to come close to our objectives for reducing the energy intensiveness of the national economy. We also took account of the conditions and potential for rationalizing energy consumption that will be developed in the course of work on restructuring the economic mechanism during the transitional period through 1995. Beginning with the 10th 5-Year Plan we plan to have the new economic management provisions fully implemented. These provisions will place great emphasis on reductions in energy intensiveness.

We also considered international comparisons and development trends in worldwide power generation. Above all we looked at developmental objectives for our national economy. Specifically, annual growth is projected to be around 3 percent in upcoming years.

After analyzing all these areas and formulating a strategy we concluded that we will not be able to stop the increase in consumption of domestic primary power resources, even though those increases will be substantially lower than they have been previously. This will occur because the very necessary increase in electricity consumption in the nonproduction sphere will not be fully offset by declines in production related consumption. This in turn will occur because the next decade is nowhere near long enough to implement all the planned structural changes in the Czechoslovak economy.

On the other hand, increasing consumption of fuels and power by the population and in the nonproduction sphere has a developmental logic of its own, resulting not only from our rising standard of living and a shift in our economy to the tertiary sector, but also from the fact that we have been overcoming our low level of electronization in comparison with developed industrial countries. After all, despite the fact that we fluctuate around fourth place worldwide in total per capita energy consumption, we are in 17th place in terms of per capita household fuel and power consumption.

The outlook for the power balance of this country in the Ninth 5-Year plan is for a trend to a much more rapid reduction in industrial power intensiveness. Increases in domestic consumption of primary energy sources should be around 2.6 million tons of standard fuel equivalent for the Ninth 5-Year Plan. Projections for the 10th

5-Year Plan call for a reduction of about 1 million tons of standard fuel equivalent, and projections for the 11th 5-Year Plan call for a reduction of 2-4 million tons of standard fuel equivalent.

It is estimated that domestic consumption of primary energy resources in the year 2005 will be approximately equal to 1990 consumption levels. This means that the entire planned increase in power supplies for the non-production sphere and the general public in the 1990-2005 period will have to be obtained at the expense of consumption by the production sphere. At the same time production is slated to increase, though with a different mix of goods than currently manufactured.

Of critical importance to the structural changes now under way is the electrification of the national economy. This is closely tied to objectives in R&D, automation, robotization and electronization of production processes, as well as with the increase in the living standards of the general public. International comparisons show that, given the projected evolution in electricity consumption in western Europe, and our efforts to approximate their consumption ratio of the nonproduction and production spheres, total electricity consumption in the CSSR by the year 2000 would be 134 terawatt hours.

We are planning only on a figure of 117 terawatt hours, however. This is the amount that we think we would be able to provide. In order to limit the burning of brown coal in traditional power plants we are counting on the construction of nuclear power plants in the scope outlined by the 17th CPCZ Congress. This means that by the year 2000 we should have available 10,000 megawatts of installed nuclear capacity, and by the year 2005 some 13-14,000 megawatts. This would allow us to generate almost 60 percent of all our electricity in nuclear power plants.

We consider these projected electricity generation figures to be minimums. This is because structural changes related to electrification occur in all mature economies, making it possible further to modernize the power generation base for industry, transportation, and agriculture. This also, understandably, creates conditions for improving labor productivity, achieving greater rationalization of production consumption, and the elimination of sources of mismanagement. Research findings indicate that if our current, energy intensive industrial output had to be produced at the technological level of the developed countries we would have only about 75 percent of the necessary electricity, at the same time that there would be an excess of equivalent fuels.

Future plans call on the one hand for gradual restrictions on energy intensive products (and therefore reduced electricity consumption) and on the other hand for the more rapid implementation of R&D findings and the introduction of technologically and ecologically clean products (which will increase electricity consumption). This is why it is somewhat unclear exactly what the

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impact of these conflicting trends will be on consumption. This forces us to operate with some reserve capacity so we can flexibly react to future developments without restricting supplies.

Based on these analyses our projections for electricity generation through the year 2000 are shown on Table 2. To assure essential production in traditional steam power plants and in centralized heating plants, for necessary deliveries of brown coal to consumer inventories and industrial users, it is necessary to extract coal at levels shown in Table 3.

Table 2. Projected Electricity Production (terawatt hours)

	1990	1995	2000	2005
Total Composed of:	96.2	107.0	117.0	126.0
Steam power plants Nuclear power plants	49.6 25.0	40.3 43.7	37.5 57.0	35.5 68.0
	_5.0	75.7	57.0	30.0

Table 3. Federal Ministry of Fuels and Power Projected Development of Bituminous Coal Extraction (million tons)

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	2000	2005
95.3	94.5	92.0	88.3	87.7	86.7	75.0	55-60

Decreasing brown coal extraction depends mainly on the rate of reduction of the energy intensiveness of the national economy, on possibilities for developing nuclear power and increasing natural gas imports, which will serve as gradual substitutes for solid and liquid fuels. We must recognize that these objectives are linked. Maintaining the planned pace of construction of nuclear power plants that are projected to satisfy needs for future electricity consumption and to take over some of the output of traditional plants is one of the essential preconditions for reducing the extraction and therefore the burning of brown coal.

In terms of energy imports, it is generally known that they greatly hamper our balance of payments. Likewise, integration projects for which we receive natural gas as payment are also costly. It is, by the way, logical that we should have to pay for such sophisticated power sources as natural gas or crude oil with high quality products. Our economy does not produce excess numbers of such products.

Opinions differ as to how our fuel and power balance should be made up. Each opinion is supported by references to other countries. We have to learn from the rest of the world. However, in this area there is clearly only one conclusion, that there is no one model of a fuel and power base. Every country manages its fuel and power policy with a view to which resources it can most efficiently obtain either domestically or from imports.

This is why we are developing our fuel and power complex in an attempt to develop optimal ties between usage of our domestic wealth of raw materials for power generation and imported resources, while simultaneously improving the ecological situation and the planned development of our society. Of course we operate with the constraints dictated mainly by economic possibilities. It is no longer possible to pursue an extensive growth path. It is therefore very important for us to develop a balanced fuel and power balance in upcoming years not only by finding new reserves, but mainly by rationalizing consumption at a much higher level.

HUNGARY

Independent Legislators Hear Economist's Critical Views

25000240a Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 22 Apr 89 pp 54-55

[Article by Endre Babus: "Representatives Concerning the Deficit—Danger of Collapse"]

[Text] An independent economist presented his views concering the economy at the Friday [21 Apr] session of the non-MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] member parliamentary faction. The presentation stirred up legislative tempers.

Economist Laszlo Lengyel caused some uncomfortable moments in Parliament for a number of independent legislators. Quite a few representatives were dumfounded at a meeting of the nonparty faction, moreover they rejected the analysis concerning economic conditions and the outlook for budgetary reform presented by Lengyel, an associate at the Financial Research Inc. No doubt, Lengyel ventured to discuss a thankless issue. In describing Hungary's financial situation he openly held Parliament responsible for the critical conditions that evolved. He said that the mentality of legislators accustomed to promote local and [industrial] branch interests contributes to the increasingly apparent disintegration of the economy. The same effect is achieved by granting too much freedom to the cabinet through budgetary approvals.

"All signs indicate that the 1989 state budget approved by you will collapse," the economist announced. The cabinet is unable to deal with the huge state household deficit amounting to 72 billion forints in 1988. Similarly, all signs indicate that the deficit of the central budget which is part of the state administrative budget (the budget does not show several segregated expense categories, such as the amount representing the Bos-Nagymaros investment) will exceed 1989 planned levels by 20 billion forints.

(According to a statement issued after last week's special meeting of the Council of Ministers that budgetary deficit may increase even to 35 billion forints.)

Holding the cabinet responsible for the present critical situation is the duty of representatives, an obligation that cannot be postponed: The cabinet should report from what sources, for what purposes and how much it spent during the initial months of the year. Uncontrolled money is pouring out through gaping holes on the state budget, to finance large investments and for the maintenance of the residential subsidy system among other matters. The latter required state subsidies amounting to 40 billion forints in 1988, and 62 billion forints in the current year. (The 1989 budget is based on a 527.1 billion forint revenue estimate.) "The younger generation is forced to pay the debt service on 30 year mortgages obtained by today's middle aged at a 2 or 3 percent interest rate—an increasingly burdensome expense if viewed along with a 15- to 16-percent inflation rate,' Lengyel said. He suggests the need for a forceful regrouping of income between these two strata. Lengyel acknowledged the fact that it would be painful to touch interest rates tied to old residential mortgage loans, without doing so however, the shortage of homes cannot be resolved particularly from the standpoint of those starting their careers. Regarding the introduction of toll roads the economist said that this is only the tip of an iceberg-of a financial maneuver which became known as a result of this project. Far greater budgetary reallocations than the 1.5 billion removed from the transportation budget have taken place. For example, in the recent past the agricultural branch received 10.5 billion forints in supplemental state subsidies.

Toward the end of May the conceptual outline of the budget reform proposal is expected to be submitted to Parliament. In this context Lengyel discussed primarily the principles of financial sharing between the central power and autonomous units of government. In Lengyel's view it would be necessary to discontinue the practice of permitting county administrations to have the right to distribute resources within their respective jurisdictions, because this practice results in the grant of power to 19 small kingdoms, and into the hands of new county executives and country administrators [the titles refer to the powerful positions that existed prior to 1945]. Similarly, in the future it should be guaranteed that in addition to personal income taxes, a predetermined part of general sales taxes and entrepreneurial profit taxes paid in by local firms represent an income to councils.

Decentralized funds—simply put: funds which do not appear in the budget—must not only be reviewed as many suggest, they must be discontinued. In Lengyel's view Parliament could obtain a full view of financial processes only if the present budget law is replaced by a state administrative budget which includes all public expenses and revenues. Considering the importance of such legislation, it should be provided for in an appendix to the constitution. The economist feels that the fate of

budgetary reform also turns on the kinds of decisions made relative to the pension system. Budgetary deficit may increase further as a result of the growing number of pensioners and provisions for automatic increases in pensions. The distribution of income between the active and inactive strata is a matter on which the new political organizations cannot avoid taking positions, according to the economist. This dilemma is no smaller than the one presented by the drafting of the constitution. It must be resolved through bargaining between societal groups, and not at the level of specialized apparatuses.

Tempers at the meeting became heated when Lengyel said that local and branch interest groups continue to rule the country. Up until then these groups could largely prevent, for example, the discontinuation of inefficient mining and foundry production, moreover they forced the creation of a regulatory system in which the foundry industry which appeared as a crisis industry yesterday, appears profitable today. This was accomplished at the price of writing off several billion forints in losses, Lengvel reminded the legislators. There is a need for a strong cabinet which accepts responsibility in today's constrained situation for taking emergency steps that strike the middle class on the one hand, while they amputate the centers of mass bankruptcy, even if in certain sectors (e.g., in Tatabanya and the Pecs sector) this creates tensions. Continued financing of loss sources is possible only if the leadership spreads the burden and withdraws increasing amounts from everyone, the expert cautioned.

Several representatives received Lengyel's words with no small reservation. Jozsef Sasvari, the delegate from Dorog felt that the economist's views were one-sided, and described the miners' difficult working conditions, the culture of their trade, and the social tensions that would ensue as a result of a possible shutdown of mines. In questioning the right to interfere by those not in power, Ferenc Kallai heard the critical remarks coming from "outside the party line" with adverse feelings. Lengyel's opinion amounts to "empty chatter" as long as independent economists do not come up with a "counterbudget," presenting an alternative to the official submission, according to the representative, Karoly Eke. Lengyel reminded the representatives that last November at a PPF [Patriotic People's Front] gathering several independent experts called the representatives' attention to problems in this year's budget.

Eke, a Csongrad Country representative suggested at the meeting that the group of independent representatives nominate a non-MSZMP member to the vacant post of deputy president of Parliament and recommended Istvan Fodor for the post. Fodor would accept the nomination, according to Eke. In the end, the independent faction decided that it would initiate the nomination of their colleague at the meeting of Budapest and country representative delegations. At present Fodor heads the group of independent representatives.

Synthetics: Polypropylene Plant Founded 25000249a Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Apr 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Plant Dedication at TVK"]

[Text] A factory was built in record time, altogether in the course of 20 months within the Tisza Chemical Combine [TVK] in Leninvaros. Using leading edge, modern technology, polypropylene, a new synthetic material for which there is a demand in both the domestic and the international markets, and which can be sold easily over the long term will be manufactured here. This is what the deputy industry minister, Istvan Kortvelyes, said at a dedication ceremony held at industry headquarters. Guests included the MSZMP CC [Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Central Committeel secretary and Politburo member, Pal Ivanyi. The 4.7-billion forint total investment accomplished under a leasing arrangement is based on technical plans and equipment provided by the Italian Montedison and Tecnimont firms. Some 2 months before the factory's completion the factory produced 5,000 tons of marketable products in the test run. Considering enterprise strategy as well as the interest of the people's economy, the new plant exemplifies modern thinking and business policy worthy of being emulated.

In praising the TVK accomplishments, the deputy minister said that the enterprise ranks 10th among Hungarian business organizations, third among enterprises, and is the most successful enterprise within the chemical industry. Its production significantly improves Hungary's foreign exchange balance.

Pal Ivanyi spoke at the plant dedication ceremony. In praising the developmental activities of the enterprise, and in analyzing the people's economy situation he recognized the fact that it is possible to dedicate a factory which proved its efficiency and productivity already in the course of its test run.

The CC Secretary and member of the Politburo said to this reporter and to the Miskolc radio reporter that he finds the initiative particularly remarkable because in establishing the polypropylene factory TVK utilized its own development funds and bank loans rather than central state subsidies. In recognizing labor, he said that he approved of the idea that all those who helped realize surplus production should be paid wages substantially larger than average, because only wages paid on the basis of real merit can lead to strong motivation. We must accept the fact that the market will also affect wage differentiation. Some better firms will attract a better work force, and by that such firms will gain further strength. We cannot progress with a weak average, according to Ivanyi.

Medals were distributed at the ceremony to workers involved in development and implementation.

ROMANIA

Measures To Promote Thermal Energy Equipment Exports

27000059 Bucharest REVISTA ECONOMICA in Romanian 31 Mar 89 pp 11-12

[Article by Eng Adrian Popa and Eng Mircea Cardu, Institute of Scientific Research and Technological Engineering for Energy Equipment: "Competitive Exports Through Accelerated Renovation Cycles"]

[Text] One of the main factors in promoting exports of industrial products in general, and particularly those of thermal-energy units, which are highly advanced products, is technical progress in design and construction of such units in the supplier enterprises. On the market for thermal-energy equipment, as on that for other products, the beneficiaries' options are based on three factors for competitiveness, namely high quality and reliability, short delivery deadlines, and competitive prices.

Improvement of the first factor depends upon the performances characteristic of the equipment (required by the demand for the offering) in terms of the qualitative indicators of construction and operation (weight of the assembly per rated capacity, specific consumption of heat per unit of capacity, etc.), which enhance competitiveness together with the reliability indicators.

Short delivery deadlines are determined in the first place in the research-development stage by the degree of advanced technological engineering incorporated in the product and by a design at least on a par with those of the subassemblies and components, which shortens the period of assimilation (preparation for manufacture) and, thus, the manufacturing cycle, as well, which is especially important in the case of single designs.

As for the third factor, the efficiency of both research-development and manufacture are reflected in the cost of the product. At this point it is necessary to stress the more and more generally recognized fact that higher standards for better quality are only apparently expensive, and that they do not actually increase costs. Some in-depth studies have proved that production costs are lowered by avoiding rejects in that way as well as repetitions of some tests and stages of manufacture and control, remedial actions, etc., without considering the effects on commercial competitiveness and savings in the postsale period as well. Thus, the concept of "cost of quality" is becoming more and more notorious.

Evaluation of all three of these factors in the light of the partner's requirements (which have to be better known) makes it possible to estimate prospects in competition on the international market.

Market opportunities for exporting thermal-energy equipment manufactured by Romanian industry are to be seen in the steady growth of energy consumption in the developing countries due to their economic development and the rising living standards of their populations. The current evolution of specific consumption of energy in some geographic areas with which Romania has promoted extensive economic relations provides favorable market conditions in that respect. Note that the greatest increase in energy consumption and an accordingly enormous increase in the demand for energy equipment are expected in the People's Republic of China, a very important country in our traditional export areas. And a great increase in energy consumption is also predicted for the countries of the Near East. In the future India will certainly be one of the leading countries of South Asia in the volume of the predicted increase, especially since its population growth in turn will be above average for that area.

Romania's list of exports of energy equipment has been steadily expanded. One of the first large groups of products offered for export consists of steam and hotwater boilers with capacities between 20 and 70 tons per hour, which have been delivered primarily to Asia in the last 20 years, especially steam boilers burning fuel oil. Boilers have been manufactured with natural circulation of the fluid for discharges up to 420 tons per hour and with forced circulation alone in boilers for 510-525 and 1,035 tons per hour, controlled circulation being used in hot-water boilers (with forced circulation). For burning solid fuel, the traditional grating systems are used for small boilers and combustion in a pulverized state for large ones, as well as combustion in a fluidized bed for boilers of up to 10 tons per hour in the case of steam and 10 gram calories per hour in the case of hot water. Waste-heat boilers are adjusted to the technological processes in which they are incorporated and meet the required technical standard.

Our export offerings also include electric filters manufactured on the basis of a license from the Lurgi firm (FRG) of international prestige, of which over 90 conventional units for 100,000 cubic meters per hour have been delivered, exceeding the provisions of the initial market study. Their manufacture has been completely assimilated in Romania since 1983, and a number of structural improvements have been made as well, especially to enhance their reliability. The exported installations have covered all areas of use, namely energy (Philippines), metallurgy (Turkey, GDR), construction materials (Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, North Korea), and chemistry (Syria).

Structurally the electric filters manufactured in Romania are the type with emitter electrodes in frames and agitators with electrically powered hammers (European design). That is an advantage because all the specifications for the bids coming into Romania call for that kind of structure. The high-voltage equipment for the electric filters assimilated in Romania are provided with control and automation with thyristors.

So far deliveries of turbine assemblies, another group of export products, have primarily consisted of units in the area of 3- to 12-MW capacities (except for the 50-MW turbine assembly with 3,600 rpm delivered to the Cebu thermoelectric power plant in the Philippines). Over 60 3-, 4.5-, and 12-MW turbine assemblies have been delivered to the People's Republic of China, a 3- and a 6-MW unit to India, a 4- and a 7.2-MW unit to Egypt, a 12-MW unit to Syria, and a 6- and a 12-MW unit to Turkey, while a 50-MW turbine assembly was delivered to the Philippines, as we said. The technical level of the turbine assemblies with capacities up to 50 MW can be considered comparable to the world standard for turbine assemblies without rotation reducers. In the field of capacities over 1 MW, which are important as regards the demands for exports, a 1-MW turbine assembly has been manufactured in Romania with a steam turbine rotating at 6,000 rpm and a rotation reducer between the turbine and the generator.

In order to determine the programs for future expansion of exports, multilateral analysis of the competitiveness parameters were made for all groups of products delivered for export, and the characteristics of some high-capacity thermal-energy units competitive in international bidding, which we call model units, were determined on that basis. The analysis also revealed a number of courses of action to shorten the cycle of assimilation of high-capacity energy equipment with a competitiveness in keeping with the prospective market demands:

- To this purpose we intend to provide a suitable structure for testing and finalizing the new measures adopted and for building installations for reference in promoting exports. It could be a first step in that direction to provide the respective research units with a thermoelectric power plant for the sole purpose of installing and studying modern technologies to be used in building competitive export equipment. Other steps can be taken alongside those measures, which take a relatively long time to implement, in order to improve the competitiveness parameters of the high-capacity energy equipment manufactured in Romania.
- In view of the favorable experience we now have with cooperative programs for construction of high-capacity energy equipment (We are thinking primarily of collaboration with the General Electric (GE) firm in the United States and the Ansaldo firm in Italy, with which cooperative programs are now in progress in connection with delivery by the IMGB [Bucharest Heavy Machinery Enterprise] of some technical precision parts like turbine rotors, welded turbogenerator frames, etc., along with manufacture of 700-MW turbine assemblies, under their licenses, for the Cernavoda Nuclear-Electric Power Plant), we can consider expanding our economic cooperation, a procedure now followed on a large scale by the enterprises building turbine assemblies on the international level (The Jugoturbina Enterprise in Yugoslavia is covering

a large part of its production capacity on the basis of cooperation with the KWU Enterprise in the FRG). In this context it is also possible to negotiate acquisition of plans for construction of boilers and turbine assemblies with new technologies (recirculating pumps and crushing mills for boilers, long blades for the last stage of the turbine, a combined IP-MP [Enterprise For Processing Plastics] body, cooling a turbogenerator stator with hydrogen, etc.) in the field of 150-350 MW capacities through cooperation in delivery of supplies to third markets.

This would make it possible to offer equipment up to a high world standard in a shorter time, including less time to prepare the technical offerings.

- Meanwhile, we intend to exploit some measures from the existing data bank, that is structural elements on a high technical level (blades, turbines, etc.) by introducing and testing them in turbine assemblies of domestic manufacture. Installation of a model like a new set in an existing power plant or in a special location for the purpose can be considered. This measure could lead to perfecting a new type of turbine assembly for export in the next 5-6 years.
- Development of the research and design potential would first require an adequate inventory with testing stands, enough technical-engineering personnel for a far more extensive activity than the present one, and arrangements for transition to computer-assisted design. In allocating the funds for renovation, the enterprises constructing thermal-energy equipment specially emphasize improvement of such important elements in the construction of the turbine assemblies as the blades and intake fans of the turbines, the radial and axial bearings, the cooling systems, the systems for starting the turbogenerators, etc. The

studies of promising technologies take up such aspects as the combined gas-steam thermal cycles, application of cryogenics to electric-machine building, etc. The emphasis generally placed by the enterprises in the analyzed activity on research and development is indicated, among other things, by the volume of the research-development funds allocated in a proportion of 5-10 percent of the value of the output. Special emphasis is placed on computer-assisted design, to which major funds are also allocated, in order to shorten the renovation cycle. The measures to organize extensive research-design activity, which should be considered for the stage in prospect, could take effect for about 6-7 years.

The low-capacity energy units, corresponding to turbine assemblies with unit capacities up to 50 MW, are on competitive levels as we said, while research-development operations with relatively limited values and cycles of implementation are required in order to improve their economic effectiveness (reduce the material inputs), safety in operation, and reliability. But here, too, some measures must be taken to accelerate the rate of assimilation and approval of new types of turbine assemblies specially built to meet domestic requirements that could serve as very good models for export.

Footnote

1. As for the amount of design work needed to prepare the complete construction plans for a new type of high-capacity turbine assembly, for the reader's information we note that the Skoda Enterprise organized a design group composed of 200 engineers, technicians and designers to design the 500 MW turbine assembly. This group, headquartered in Prague, worked exclusively on that design for 5 years.

HUNGARY

Sub-Carpathian Hungarian Bishop on Signs of Thaw Toward Minority, Religion 25000232b Budapest ELET ES TUDOMANY in Hungarian 16 Apr 89 p 1

[Article by Pal Forgon, bishop of the Sub-Carpathian Reformed [Calvinist] Church: "Hopeful Changes in Sub-Carpathia"]

[Text] "Behold, Almighty God the Father, we have come joyfully to Thy home"—during my 54 years of service I have heard this hymn many times, in many different places. But perhaps never the way I heard it on 5 February, in the village of Verbocz. For it was on this day, 28 years after its doors had been closed, that the gates of the church of this ancient village were reopened. Joining the 800-member congregation of this dwelling place which had been built in 1844 were nearly 3,000 brothers and sisters, gathered from far and near to rejoice with thanksgiving. Blessed be the Lord for what he has done.

It is with renewed faith that we are looking forward to the coming months, as the gates of another 6 closed churches are scheduled to be reopened to the faithful soon. Besides God's help, this may be attributed primarily to the fact that the state organs have begun to view us not as adversaries, but rather as partners. This was the theoretical principle laid down last September by the president of the Soviet Council for Religious Affairs, at a meeting at the Geneva center of the World Council of Churches. The specific practical principles supporting this tenet will be spelled out in a soon to be published canonical law, the implementation of which will clearly demonstrate the changed relationship between the state and the church. For now, we can only guess what the future will bring, but the faithful are filled with hopeful expectations. For now we are still far from being able to claim that all of our problems have been solved. As the Helsinki Agreement clearly states, for example: "The State will respect the right of parents to provide for the religious and moral upbringing of their children in accordance with their convictions."

We strongly believe that we will see continued progress. Our expectations are based on the changes that are currently taking place in our country, changes to which our church has responded with unqualified appreciation and eager support. These changes, in our opinion, amount to more than just a flash-in-the-pan type of a momentary campaign; we see them as steps leading to the fulfillment of various small, pure, and tangible pleasures of everyday life. We are convinced that after many long, cruelly cold seasons responsible for endless suffering and pain, our long awaited beautiful spring has finally arrived. In pledging our support for these changes, we will do everything we can to foster genuine brotherhood among people; to promote cooperation among believers and nonbelievers in realizing the joys of

everyday life, and preserving the peace which is our ultimate goal. Our relations are changing not only with the state, but also with the other churches. We are once again able to hold ecumenical worship services. Our efforts are aimed at establishing close ties with all church communities. We are firmly convinced that if we can pray together, we can also work and live together in peace.

In our small native land, incidentally, the Reformed Church has been in existence as a legally recognized religious community since 1552. According to historical accounts, it was then that the Beregszasz constitutional synod first convened. It is only now, for the first time since our church had come under Soviet control, that the circumstances of our existence have become more relaxed. We had to weather out the period of Stalinist tyranny. In the camps, which I myself had been unable to escape, more Calvinist Hungarians had perished than during World War II. During the years immediately following that era, our church lived a quiet existence as no one could predict what tomorrow would bring; it became stagnant, for it was unable to serve as it should have, or the way it would have liked to serve, but-as many things back then-it continued to survive. Presently, 20 ministers and 4 divinity students are serving 82 congregations. Two of the four have now been allowed to enroll a 3-year program at the Raday (Budapest, Raday College-editor's note). And here at home we have doubled their number. We are also delighted to report that several members of our church have received, and continue to enjoy recognition and distinction. Accordingly, in theory as well as in practice, we continue to believe in the principle of praying and working.

We now enjoy equal rights with the other religions. We are regularly represented at international church conferences, and world religious conventions. I, personally, am a member of the Prague Christian Peace Federation. Between 15-17 April, we will be visited by an 8-member delegation of the Calvinist World Federation. This is a sign of growing international interest in our fate.

Not long ago, the churches were given central permission to get involved in charitable work. For us this is an entirely new opportunity. In the past, we could not even talk about charitable work, for providing private social assistance was forbidden. This, however, did not stop us from providing help, or moral and material assistance to the victims of the Tecso flood of 15 years ago, and to the sufferers of the Chernobyl tragedy 3 years ago. It was with a similarly strong sense of sympathy that we made it our cause to assist the victims of the Armenian earthquake. To help alleviate their hardships, we have sent them 23,000 rubles.

Driven by strong moral convictions, our ministries are working hard to promote brotherly coexistence among the peoples of our region, both in the cities, and our increasingly more beautiful and flourishing villages. In the case of a multinational country such as ours it is extremely important for the peoples and inhabitants living here to respect, appreciate, and like one another. Our hope is that our area, where Hungarians, Ukrainians, Russians, Romanians, Germans, and Jews have lived together in peace for centuries, will continue to serve as an example for others. We also cannot remain silent about the fact that recently more and more of our brethren have been leaving their native land. The church

regrets and is opposed to emigration. After all, it leaves fewer and fewer of us Calvinists and Hungarians struggling at the foot of the Carpathians. At the same time, in each individual case we are faced with the same question: Have we done everything we can to help them feel happy here at home?!...We very much hope that together we will soon be able to make changes in this area, too. Glory to God!

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